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| 1 |
ID:
157268
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| Summary/Abstract |
RUSSIA AND BULGARIA have a very extensive history of relations that goes back ages and that has ensured the mutual spiritual enrichment of our nations. For instance, in the 10th-13th centuries, Bulgaria made a significant contribution to fostering Christian culture in Rus [Old Russia] and in the 19th century, the Russian empire played a decisive role in the formation of the sovereign Bulgarian state. Our bilateral ties were not devoid of painful downturns and setbacks as evidenced, in particular, by the breaking of diplomatic relations in 1886, 1915 and 1944. Every time, however, Russia and Bulgaria found ways of restoring the level of cooperation that had been achieved and sometimes even surpassing it.
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| 2 |
ID:
156478
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russian policy in Asia and in the Arctic share significantly overlapping elements.
One such element is the precedent set when the UN awarded the Sea of Okhotsk
to Moscow in 2013. Moscow’s subsequent conduct in closing that sea to foreign
shipping and creating a naval bastion there suggest that it may well do the same
should part or all of its very expansive claim to the Arctic zone off its territory
be recognized by the UN. Inasmuch as Russia has now militarized the Sea of
Okhotsk on the heels of the UN award and added thereby innumerable obstacles
to rapprochement with Japan while also militarizing the area still further, the
likelihood of an Arctic bastion, closed zone, and subsequent militarization cannot
be excluded. Meanwhile, in Asia, Russia will continue to remain at odds with Japan
and see much of Asia as composed of hostile and threatening powers that can only
be dealt with in a context of militarization.
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| 3 |
ID:
146274
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| Summary/Abstract |
ON FEBRUARY 15, 2016, Russia's BRICS presidency came to an end. Its results with regard to state and government agencies, business, the academic community, and civil institutions are yet to be analyzed. However, even now there is good reason to say that we have successfully accomplished the mission of helmsman at the Big Five ship, on the whole fulfilling, in the course of our work in conjunction with our partners, the directives and specific assignments that our countries' leaders formulated at the Ufa summit on July 8-9, 2015. Our focused, dedicated efforts translated into wide-ranging practical results, which were praised by our colleagues. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Russian presidency has become a landmark in BRICS development, improving the countries' collaboration within the framework of the association and enhancing its role in international affairs.
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| 4 |
ID:
147015
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a brief history of cooperation between the Russian and Chinese mass media over the last 25 years. The main directions, problems, and prospects of practical cooperation between the two countries' mass media are analyzed. The main emphasis is on widening the sphere of joint efforts in light of the nature of political and other relations between Russia and China.
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| 5 |
ID:
179507
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia is pursuing select 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies in a drive to rapidly close the capability gaps with rivals. The transformation of warfare these technologies portend could also make Russia more vulnerable. Joining the ‘technological race’ seems therefore less of a choice than an existential necessity. Constrained by structural problems and lacking the resources of the US and China, however, Russia has so far struggled to leverage its ambitions within the 4IR. Yet it has also shown the ability to experiment with 4IR technologies, including hypersonics and AI, to amplify existing symmetric and asymmetric capabilities, and create interconnected systems that may provide critical advantages.
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| 6 |
ID:
182633
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| Summary/Abstract |
The chapter examines the driving forces and the institutions behind the Russian military buildup in the period between 2010 and 2020. The beginning of the rapid Russian military modernization in late 2000s was the result of the shifting threat assesments by the Russian political leadership and the painful lessons of the war with Georgia in 2008. Russia had to conduct an throughout and painful restructuring of the military institutions and the defense industrial complex in order to be able to meet the ambitious goals of its’ rearmament program. The result was significant growth in the Russian military capabilities by the middle of the decade.
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| 7 |
ID:
190093
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| Summary/Abstract |
The completion of the natural gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ in 2019 creates new dynamics in Eurasian trade. Russia’s deepening ties with China present it with the opportunity to change its relationship with the European Union from monopsony to monopoly, thus gaining bargaining leverage. However, this argument goes both ways, being also applicable to Russo–Chinese affairs, with the European Union as the alternative option. The article concludes that Russia, while seriously strengthened by its developing energy relationship with China, will not endanger its status as a reliable supplier across Eurasia, since its nascent monopoly position depends on the existence of an alternative option.
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| 8 |
ID:
174728
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| Summary/Abstract |
The perceived threat posed to Russia from so-called colored revolutions–popular uprisings attributed by Moscow to malign sponsorship by external forces–has become a central theme in Russian security discourse. This article analyses how colored revolutions came to be characterized as a specific threat to national security and how they continue to shape Russian thinking about the changing character of conflict. It explores Russian perceptions of the threat from colored revolutions, using the concept of strategic culture as a framework to analyze these perceptions through an analysis of the Russian military theoretical literature and strategic documents. The article establishes that concerns about non-military means of destabilization reflect continuities in Russian strategic assumptions about adversaries and how they seek to achieve their national objectives. It also reveals the perpetuation of specific narratives about the country’s vulnerability to foreign interference.
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| 9 |
ID:
189796
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| Summary/Abstract |
RECENTLY, the African continent has found itself at the center of Russian and foreign media attention. We see headlines such as "Fight for Africa," "Bet on Cooperation," "The Russians Are Coming," and so on. Detailed discussions and conferences devoted to the problems and prospects of cooperation take place on various platforms. This revival is a result of the Russia-Africa Forum, which took place in 2019 in Sochi, giving a certain boost to Russia's interactions with the continent's countries and causing considerable anxiety in the Western countries that formerly colonized the continent. Preparations for the second large-scale Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg, scheduled for July 2023, are in full swing.
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| 10 |
ID:
090033
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Resetting relations is now a much-used phrase in the context of U.S.Russia relations much discussed around the world and especially in Russia. Internet users know that rebooting brings you back to the old page, and it's not a fact that some new content, some new quality may result.
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| 11 |
ID:
169562
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia and the European Union had all objective preconditions for establishing a lasting cooperative relationship, which could subsequently lead to integration. However, objective factors of their internal development and systemic changes in global politics resulted in a situation where such relations proved to be unclaimed for both parties.
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| 12 |
ID:
164218
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| Summary/Abstract |
WHEN we talk about the 60 years' sovereignty of the Republic of Guinea (Guinea) in its present borders, we mean "French Guinea," which was a "separate" colony within the federation of French West Africa with its capital in Dakar (now the capital of Senegal) from 1895 to 1958.
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| 13 |
ID:
158760
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| 14 |
ID:
186368
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia’s status as an energy superpower is waning. While Moscow is raking in short-term gains from record-high energy prices, it stands to bear long-term losses. Western sanctions, the European Union’s energy transition and Russia’s limited pivot to Asia will have profound implications for the country’s oil and gas industry. Since the Cold War, Russia’s energy sector has been tied to Europe. Moscow exported hydrocarbons to the West in exchange for Western capital and advanced technology. The war in Ukraine has forced Europe to wean itself off Russian fossil fuel and accelerate its energy transition. Russia’s energy decoupling from the EU will affect the structure of the state budget and alter the fabric of the Russian economy. The country’s pivot to Asia can only partially offset Europe’s decision to cut out Russian hydrocarbons. Furthermore, Moscow will become ever more reliant on Beijing, exacerbating their already asymmetrical relations.
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| 15 |
ID:
157761
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article focuses on Russia’s approach to international security in Northeast Asia.
It argues that Russia’s unique position is that it is not a party of any major security–
political conflict, takes a neutral position on territorial conflicts as best suiting its
interests of promoting cooperation with all East Asian states and objects to the
involvement of third parties. Russia is involved only in a dispute with Japan where
it demonstrates a flexible position. As a comparatively weak regional player, Russia
is interested in maintaining peace, stability and the status quo, in particular on the
Korean Peninsula, and has no revisionist agenda in East Asia. Major elements of
Russia’s approach include creating an inclusive, open, transparent and equitable
regional security architecture, support for polycentric regional order with Russia
as one of the major centers of power, criticism of the U.S.–sponsored MBD as
well as focus on a strategic partnership with China. Intensifying its Asian pivot,
Moscow is increasingly concerned with the tensions on the Korean Peninsula
where it promotes denuclearization, dialogue between the two Koreas, resumption
of the Six–Party Talks and opposes to the dangerous actions of all parties. Russia
and China advocate a “moratorium for a moratorium” proposal as the only way to
mitigate tensions and create a common security mechanism.
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| 16 |
ID:
160598
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| Summary/Abstract |
International Affairs: In 2018, we will mark the 190th anniversary of Russian-Greek diplomatic relations. What is it like for Russian diplomats to work in Greece, and are there any nuances in interaction between the Russian Embassy and the Greek government?
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| 17 |
ID:
169154
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper evaluates Russia’s increased naval presence in the Asian–Pacific region,
considering the naval interactions with China, India, Vietnam, the Philippines
etc., an important component of Russia’s national strategy and maritime policy
in the region. By strengthening cooperation with the navies of these countries in
different parts of the world, Moscow demonstrates its political preferences and
military capabilities by checking the combat readiness of its own Navy, as well as
modernizing its strategy and tactics, taking into account the modern experience of
combat operations among the other fleets. It then presents a valuable opportunity for
Russia to defend its national interests while remaining a non-aligned and predictable
actor. By analyzing the dynamics, metrics and substance of Russia’s naval activities,
the author tries to clarify the strategic goals of the Russian and other countries’
navies, and also to define some qualitative characteristics, such as the level of
interaction between the Russian Navy and each of its partners, operational tasks of
the exercises, etc. In addition, Russia’s joint maneuvers not only maintain its status
as a great maritime power and raises its international authority but also may serve as
a balancing factor for the U.S. and Chinese navies to improve the security situation
in the Asia–Pacific.
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| 18 |
ID:
147753
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE LECTIO MAGISTRAIIS OF ROMANO PRODI in Moscow on March 17, 2016, organized by the journal International Affairs, was one of those events that will be remembered for a long time to come by those who attended and had the chance to meet the former European Commission President and two-time Italian Prime Minister.
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| 19 |
ID:
188507
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| Summary/Abstract |
Alexander Gasyuk, Rossiyskaya gazeta correspondent in Cyprus: Russia-Cyprus relations have traditionally been friendly and always been marked by a high level of mutual trust. What is the current state of relations between our countries in the context of today's international challenges, considering that Nicosia has joined the unprecedented EU sanctions against Russia?
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