| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kenneth Waltz is a structural theorist. While scholars often comment on Waltz's conception of structure, they rarely address the philosophical assumptions behind it - assumptions that go back to Kant and finally to Aristotle. Appropriately situated, Waltz's conception of structure points to a strong version of constructivist social theory. To make my case, I trace Waltz's view of political structure in his early work, recapitulate his views on science, models and theory, address the question of his (or any) theory's relation to `reality', illustrate his difficulty with structural theory and institutional reality, and consider the vexed question of any theory's fit to a world already talked into existence. I show how close Waltz is to a philosophical position that solves his problem with theory's relation to reality and specifies the conditions under which any social theory can make sense or use of the term structure.
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