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| 1 |
ID:
114263
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past decade scholarly consensus has moved away from viewing turmoil in Turkey as a product of religious-cultural incompatibility with modernization. Instead, scholars have shown that the rise of an Islamic elite has expanded democracy in Turkey, while often vexing the secularist elite. This article reviews the most important of the new scholarship, but criticizes it for inheriting the assumption that all events in Turkey somehow hinge upon Islamist-secularist antagonism. Alternatively, insights from sociology are employed to argue that domestic Turkish discord is intimately related to industrialization and democratization, and that excessive attention to supposedly religious conflict blinds much contemporary scholarship to the intolerant Sunni-Turkish nationalism cultivated by the Turkish state.
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| 2 |
ID:
120782
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arab Awakening augurs the return of political contestation to key Arab societies in which little more than token opposition had been tolerated. Unfolding experiments in democratisation in which Islamically-oriented parties are leading players are underway but the prospects for the consolidation of stable political systems in key counties, such as Egypt or Syria are problematic. These developments have hastened a new regional balance of power in which Saudi Arabia and its allies have sought to stem the tide of change as well as thwart the hegemonial ambitions of Iran. Persistent issues, particularly the Israel-Palestine conflict, remain unresolved and have a powerful grip on the conscience of the Arab world. Key external powers, especially the United States, confront not only stubborn familiar issues but also a host of new strategic, economic, diplomatic and military challenges.
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| 3 |
ID:
163210
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although militant groups have been present in Bangladesh since the 1990s, the country catapulted to international media attention on July 1, 2016, after an attack on a café in the upscale neighborhood of the capital Dhaka. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack which killed 29 people, mostly foreigners. The attack came in the wake of a series of attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, foreigners, liberal activists, authors, and publishers by both an AQIS affiliate and ISIS. The government denied the existence of militant groups tied to international terrorist organizations. Despite these developments and instances of Bangladeshis joining the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there has been very little in-depth discussion about who these militants are and what is driving Bangladeshis to militancy. This article addresses this lacuna. This paper examines the common traits of alleged Bangladeshi militants and explores the factors of radicalization. Drawing on media reports of the profiles of the alleged militants, between July 2014 and June 2015, and between July 2016 and August 2017, the article finds that most of the Bangladeshi militants are young, educated males increasingly coming from well-off families. We have also found evidence that four factors—social relationships, use of the Internet, personal crises, and external relations—appear most frequently in the narratives of Bangladeshi
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| 4 |
ID:
101801
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The object of this article is to introduce a careful reading of Arab/Islamic anti-Semitism in view of the conflicting approaches to its assessment. Three aspects are covered: the origins of this anti-Semitism and its relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict; the impact of Nazism on Arab/Islamic anti-Semitism; and the place of anti-Semitism in the ideology of Islamist movements, highlighting a much neglected feature - the Arab discourse on Arab/Islamic anti-Semitism. It contends that the image of the Jew as an irredeemably destructive, conspiratorial agent, hostile not only to Arabs and Muslims but to humanity at large, is a relatively new phenomenon, gradually striking roots especially among Islamists.
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| 5 |
ID:
166769
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to explore how the intellectual thinking and political actions of an Islamist could be developed and changed toward a more realistic view. The Kuwaiti Islamic Students’ movement in the UK was led by the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood under the Free Kuwait Campaign during the Second Gulf Crisis in 1990-91. This movement went through a significant development and change of ideas and practices with other political and societal groups. Dealing with all segments of Kuwait’s society as partners in the country and its destiny, and not as intellectual or party opponents, was the main change in ideas. Moreover, a qualitative leap in realistic political thought emerged among these young people and affected the future of the movement. In the immediate post-invasion era, this action was not invested towards building an open national platform. However, the students’ actions were influenced by the event, and pro Islam al-’i’tilafiyah became more accepting of others, leading to many students from other ideologies joining the ranks. Moreover, nationalistic ideas crept into Islamic thoughts in the post-invasion era, leading to a mixture of ideologies rendering one ‘moderate’ or ‘conservative’ that was described by stricter Islamists as ‘lenient’.
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| 6 |
ID:
142179
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Edward Said's concept of orientalism was developed from his perception of the role of scholarship in the West's exploitation of the East for the purpose of conquest and the maintenance of political power. It was not simply a construct of Eastern inferiority versus Western superiority. Hassan Hanafi, chair of philosophy at Cairo University, first encouraged a “science of occidentalism” to counter orientalist studies.1 However, as Syrian philosopher Sadiq al-Azm has suggested, one must heed Said's warning to the subjects and victims of orientalism against the dangers of applying the readily available structures, styles and ontological biases of orientalism upon themselves and others.2 That would result in orientalism in reverse, or the internalizing of orientalist political intentions.
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| 7 |
ID:
109786
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Suicide attacks are an important, and effective, terror tactic in Al Qaeda and other Islamist Movements' (AQOIM) tool kit as they wage jihad al saghir (lesser jihad) against the kuffar (infidels). The successful 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil would not have been possible without the willingness of 19 young Arab men to commit intihar (suicide). AQOIM's "marketing" of suicide attacks in their propaganda campaigns as "martyrdom operations," leads one to ask: Is the use of suicide as a military tactic in war against the kuffar sanctioned in Islam both scripturally and/or by the interpretations/opinions of Muslim scholars and religious figures, as well as by the Muslim public? This article explores the ongoing jihad (struggle) within Islam on what does and does not constitute "martyrdom operations." It does so by exploring the legality of such acts through the lens of Islamic doctrine (Quran and Hadith), as well as studying the interpretations of respected ulema (scholars) on whether or not suicide attacks are indeed "martyrdom operations" to be praised as "halal," or to be condemned as "haram" (forbidden).
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| 8 |
ID:
166586
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| Publication |
New Delhi, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd., 2019.
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| Description |
xii, 268p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789387324831
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059684 | 297.4/KUM 059684 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
119175
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| 10 |
ID:
090190
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Americans have short memories, at least when it comes to the Middle East.Once again pundits and opinion makers are jumping aboard the democracy-promotion train.There seems to be a renewed longing for the heady days of the Bush administration when the Washington conventional wisdom held that democracy promotion was the best antidore to regional anti-Americanism and terrorism.
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| 11 |
ID:
118862
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| 12 |
ID:
122423
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2013.
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Mali has been faced with a series of uprisings by its Tuareg over a number of years. Although each of these rebellions was ended by a cease-fire, the Malian government never succeeded in instituting longer term peace agreements. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion has presented even more significant security threats. The environment in northern Mali now is marked by multiple armed groups, with multiple competing agendas. This complex situation, with Tuareg rebels, Islamists with varying goals, and local militias, with a pattern of varying levels of cooperation and conflict, will at best be very difficult to resolve in the long term. Combined with an almost complete security vacuum in northern Mali on the part of the government, this situation could be intractable even with external intervention. At the same time, the focus on counterterrorism in northern Mali may not be conducive to a long-term resolution of what in reality is a much more complicated security environment.
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| 13 |
ID:
116410
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In heated struggles for power like election campaigns, political rivals are villainized through othering in the mass media. This is clearly the case in Turkey where society is structurally polarized along ethnic, religious, regional and political cleavages as well as sociological conflict lines between Islamists and secularists, urban (and Thracian) citizens in coastal cities and rural Anatolian villagers. The anti-Semitist (V)Akit newspaper, which attracts attention with its immoderate, militant, Sunni-Islamist discourse, used negative stereotypes in headlines and news coverage, columns, cartoons and caricatures. The daily tried to villainize its secularist rivals like Thracians and Kemalists by using inflammatory, abusive words and defamatory allegations.
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| 14 |
ID:
185212
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| Summary/Abstract |
Pakistan began the year with an energized opposition that directly challenged the military establishment, but as the year progressed, the opposition alliance fell apart under the strain of internal divisions. The military establishment pushed back against the ruling PTI and regained control of the political system. Religious extremists were emboldened and posed a challenge to both civilian and military centers of power. The economy rebounded from the collapse of 2020, but Pakistan continues to face macro- and micro-economic challenges. The Delta variant took its toll on Pakistanis, but the government was able to make significant progress in its vaccination program by the end of 2021. Pakistan gained considerable geostrategic leverage due to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.
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| 15 |
ID:
093962
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| 16 |
ID:
117462
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the heart of the notion of the postsecular is an implied and largely under-theorised idea of resistance against the pathologies of modern secular formations. This is most notably exemplified by Jürgen Habermas's highly influential approach which argues that these pathologies can be resisted through a cooperative cognitive effort of secular and religious consciousnesses. This article contends that this understanding overlooks more embodied forms of resistance to the effect that it curtails our capacity to conceptualise postsecular resistance in international relations. Following a contextualisation of Habermas's approach in the broader Kantian tradition to which it belongs, the article develops a contending Foucauldian reading of the body as a locus of resistance and uses this framework to analyse some of the events leading to the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The focus is on the publication of images and videos of police abuses by Egyptian bloggers and independent media as a practice of resistance to the widespread and systematic use of torture. The emotional response to these images, it will be argued, contributed to unite Egyptians despite longstanding fractures, most notably that between secularists and Islamists, thus turning the body from an 'inscribed surface of events' into a postsecular locus of resistance. The article concludes by highlighting the main implications of this analysis for future research agendas on the postsecular in international relations.
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| 17 |
ID:
103400
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| 18 |
ID:
157484
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ever since Bangladesh became independent in 1971 and proclaimed secularism among its four-pronged constitutional core objectives, the world’s third largest Muslim country has been struggling with this concept and its practical manifestations. The temptation of misusing religion in heavily politicised contexts and contestations over social, political and economic interests and development remains ever-present. The violently antagonistic relations between secular and non-secular forces, this article offers some fresh insights into the dynamics of relationships between religion, politics and Islamist militancy in contemporary Bangladesh through discourse analysis. While the hegemonic nature of the deeply contested state apparatus has dominated the headlines, the space for secularism as a sustainable common platform for all people of Bangladesh has appeared to be shrinking. However, this article shows that not all is lost, provided new balances can be found.
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| 19 |
ID:
095494
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When states collapse, so do the most obvious obstacles to violent extremism in their territory. Extremists seem free to recruit and operate from these areas without interference from state security forces. In reality, however, state collapse creates as many constraints as opportunities for extremists. This paper problematizes the commonly held view that there is a strong link between state collapse and the rise of extremism, in particular Al Qaeda-linked extremism, that creates security threats worldwide. By comparing the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia and Al Qaeda in Iraq in Iraq, the paper discusses the implications of state collapse for Islamist extremism. Our empirical analysis suggests that although there is a correlation between state collapse and an increase in Islamists' appeal and influence, state collapse does not necessarily generate more violent ideologies. Rather, state collapse allows those committed to violence under all circumstances to ally more moderate elements. If the population comes to see the Islamists as destabilizing rather than securing, they may turn on them, leading the moderate Islamists to either break with the extremists, or follow them to the political margins. Similarly, extremists may grow weary of moderate actions, demanding that the group increase its violence and, again, forcing moderates to choose between the extremists' vision and broad political support. Therefore, our main finding is that contrary to the commonly held view, the population of a collapsed state, rather than an extremists' hotbed, can, in fact, be a potentially powerful anti-extremist force.
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| 20 |
ID:
145057
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Under the Bourguiba and Bin ʿAli regimes, the early 20th-century women's rights advocate Tahar Haddad (1899–1935) was a symbol of “state feminism.” Nationalist intellectuals traced the 1956 Personal Status Code to Haddad's work, and Bourguiba and Bin ʿAli claimed to “uphold” his ideals and “avenge” the persecution he suffered at the hands of the ʿulamaʾ at the Zaytuna mosque-university. Breaking with “old regime” narratives, this article studies Haddad as a reformist within Tunisia's religious establishment. Haddad's example challenges the idea that Islamic reformists “opened the door to” secularists in the Arab world. After independence, Haddad's ideas were not a starting point for Tunisia's presidents, but a reference point available to every actor in the political landscape.
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