| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The breathtaking level of unprecedented change within the Russian armed forces, first announced in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, not only proved rapid and quite unlike any of the failed reform attempts since 1992, but it caught many in the West and Russia unawares. While many concentrated on the proposed downsizing of the officer corps, which planned to axe 205,000 officers in order to maximize efficiency, a yet greater changed quietly and systematically implemented in the course of 2009 went almost unnoticed in the West; yet its policy implications will compel western governments to reassess their relations with Russia and their understanding of Russia's defense posture. In short, the mass mobilization principle, which had hitherto defined the Russian military, passed quietly into history, as the division-based structure within the table of organization was steadily and completely replaced by a new brigade-based structure.
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