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| 1 |
ID:
130617
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| 2 |
ID:
125195
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Pacific War ended in 1945 before the American government had established a plan for the implementation of its postwar goals for its relationship with China. Although China lacked unification, the Guomindang (GMD), the "allied" government, sought to create a more modern military along American lines, with American equipment, using American advisers and funding. GMD leaders did not want American influence or control, desiring to maintain their culturally organized structures and ways of functioning, including the use of guanxi (personal networks and favors). The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group attempted to operate within this nexus of conflicting goals, purposes, and missions.
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| 3 |
ID:
138723
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since its European settlement in 1788, Australia has been dependent on great-power protectors for its security. Initially this security was achieved by virtue of Australia’s status as a British colony, later as a member of the British Commonwealth. In return for its protection, Australia committed military forces in support of British interests to the Sudan, in the Boer War, and in the First and Second World Wars. Australian support for these actions was premised on two key factors: Australia’s membership in the Empire (and with that the identity of its citizens as “independent Australian-Britons”) and the assessment, universal among Australians, that support and protection of the Empire and of British interests were also in their interest
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| 4 |
ID:
039073
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| Publication |
New York, Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963.
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| Description |
vii, 116p.Hbk
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| Series |
Military History of World War II
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| Contents |
Vol. IX
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 008101 | 940.54/DUP 008101 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
144202
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the 1930s Japan developed a death cult which had a profound effect on the conduct of the Japanese armed forces in the Pacific War, 1941–1945. As a result of government directed propaganda campaign after the overthrow of the Shogunate in 1868, the ruling military cliques restored an Imperial system of government which placed Emperor Meiji as the Godhead central to the constitution and spiritual life of the Japanese nation. A bastardised Bushido cult emerged. It combined with a Social-Darwinist belief in Japan's manifest destiny to dominate Asia. The result was a murderous brutality that became synonymous with Japanese treatment of prisoners of war and conquered civilians. Japan's death cult was equally driven by a belief in self-sacrifice characterised by suicidal Banzai charges and kamikaze attacks. The result was kill ratios of Japanese troops in the Pacific War that were unique in the history of warfare. Even Japanese civilians were expected to sacrifice their lives in equal measure in the defence of the homeland. It was for this reason that American war planners came to the shocking estimate that as many as 900,000 Allied troops could die in the conquest of mainland Japan – Operation DOWNFALL. Contrary to the view of numbers of revisionist historians in the post-war period, who have variously argued that the atom bombs were used to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, Francis Pike, author of Hirohito's War, The Pacific War, 1941 – 1945 [Bloomsbury 2015] reaffirms that the nuclear weapon was used for one purpose alone – to bring the war to a speedy end and to save the lives of American troops.
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| 6 |
ID:
090545
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the opening stages of the Pacific War, between December 1941 and spring 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army appeared unstoppable. US forces in the Philippines, despite their efforts, could not hold out against the enemy advance, and by April the last vestiges of their resistance at Bataan and Corregidor became untenable. The intelligence obtained during the initial encounters provided the US defense establishment with undeniable reasons to conclude that Japanese ground forces possessed a high level of tactical skill, and assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army tended to exaggerate the latter's capabilities.
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| 7 |
ID:
048669
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| Publication |
Colorado, Westview Press, 1996.
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| Description |
x, 260p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0813318122
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039258 | 952.04/HAN 039258 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
031774
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| Publication |
London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1959.
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| Description |
xiv, 727p.: ill.Hbk
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| Series |
History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series
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| Contents |
Vol. II
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 009225 | 940.54/MED 009225 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
114252
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2012.
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Following Japan's successful attacks against Allied targets throughout the Far East and the Pacific in December 1941, Canada focused on protecting its own Pacific coastline in British Columbia, participating in joint US-Canadian defence measures as required. Canadian authorities removed all Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast, placed conscript troops in British Columbia, and searched for other enemies in the province. They investigated subversion and sought to avert coastal attacks, whilst Japan conducted nuisance raids and maintained a presence in the Aleutians. Recently declassified intelligence files show that several factors influenced the way in which Canadian authorities viewed 'the enemy within' and 'the Pacific threat'. During the Pacific War, the Canadian conscription policy, public complacency, wartime allegiances and enemy activity along the coast all impacted the way in which security intelligence was collected and interpreted in British Columbia.
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| 10 |
ID:
130375
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| 11 |
ID:
125260
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2013.
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Over the past six decades, the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States has become one of the most successful military alliances in history. Numerous strategic changes are anticipated in Northeast Asia over the coming years, including the risk of a military attack by North Korea and a shift in the balance of power. Among multiple factors that contribute to the success of an alliance, one key factor is sharing a common vision of the future since sharing this is crucial to enhance the trust shared today and to reinforce the alliance's capability to respond effectively to any new challenges that may arise. This paper seeks to offer a vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance and make suggestions on how the alliance can develop and improve in the future by trying to forecast changes in the security circumstances surrounding the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia until around 2030. As a result, this paper finds the fact that maintaining the ROK-U.S. alliance is the optimal choice for both countries until 2030, despite the various strategic changes in Northeast Asia, including a possible national reunification of the Korean Peninsula and presents a long-term vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance based on this fact and some implementation strategies for this vision.
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| 12 |
ID:
160177
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| Publication |
Germany, Scribbles, 2018.
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| Description |
v, 672p.pbk
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| Contents |
Vol. I
2 Vol. Set Price is Rs. 3500.00
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| Standard Number |
9789387513051
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059444 | 940.53/PHI 059444 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
160178
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| Publication |
Germany, Scribbles, 2018.
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| Description |
v, 673-1338p.pbk
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| Contents |
Vol. II
2 vol. set Price is Rs. 3500.00
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| Standard Number |
9789387513051
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059445 | 940.53/PHI 059445 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
001734
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| Publication |
London, Macmillan, 1999.
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| Description |
xvi, 242p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0333744799
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041361 | 952/HEN 041361 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
173651
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| 16 |
ID:
138701
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| Summary/Abstract |
Was the battle of Midway won or lost? In a recent edition of the Naval War College
Review, James Levy grappled with some of the recurrent issues found in the scholarship of the battle of Midway, all of them related to the question whether one or another aspect of the Japanese way of war led to a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the U.S. Navy.
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| 17 |
ID:
037690
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| Publication |
Marland, The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co of America, 1986.
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| Description |
xii, 244p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0933852479
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 030041 | 951.9042/HAL 030041 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
193155
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the 20 years before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Great Britain based its grand strategy in the Far East around the presence – and potential – of the Singapore Naval Base. The Americans, for a time, agreed in the project’s potential in the face of increasing Japanese belligerence. This analysis examines the place of the Singapore Naval Base in Anglo-American planning for the defence of Southeast Asia. It focuses on British efforts to lobby the Americans to deploy the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to deter Japan, the evolution of American plans for the defence of the Far East, and how all these interacted. It argues that the British desire to use the Pacific Fleet as a deterrent force based at Singapore, and the American assessments of how the Pacific Fleet would actually fight Japan from Singapore, represented a conceptual disconnect they could not overcome until faced with imminent hostilities. Scrutinizing the discussions and plans related to this understudied episode provides additional understanding not only how the aspirant allies viewed the growing threat from Japan, but also how they viewed each other.
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| 19 |
ID:
096913
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Throughout the years prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, the United States defence establishment held an ambiguous view on Japanese policy and strategic aims. A number of factors precluded a clear-cut forecast, among the most important of which was the opportunistic and secretive manner in which Japanese leaders formulated their plans. Under the circumstances, the available intelligence could not provide a definite indication of the moves which the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) would undertake. The situation was further complicated because reliable pieces of evidence revealed Japan did not possess the military and economic resources to defeat a coalition of several Great Powers. The Americans were thus not inclined to expect the Imperial forces to undertake a full-scale conquest of the Asia-Pacific region. The inadequate knowledge of Japanese war plans, in turn, was one of the key factors which led United States defence officials to believe that efforts to bolster their military strength in the Far East were not necessary.
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| 20 |
ID:
139070
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The United States shares with many Pacific powers both relief that the world returned to peace, after the greatest conflagration in world history, and pride in its role in the subsequent transformation of world affairs. Human rights and human dignity strike a deep chord with Americans. Distinct from Asian nations on whose soil the war was largely fought, however, the United States is more detached, in general, from wartime bitterness, and places priority on forward-looking, multi-tiered institution-building across Northeast Asia. Stable relations of mutual respect among the United States and its two major regional allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, are a special priority, with broader regional confidence-building also considered important.
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