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| 1 |
ID:
013221
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| Publication |
Dec 1997.
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| Description |
27-30
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| 2 |
ID:
075737
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article sets forth a framework for analysis designed to enhance our understanding of the political management of coalition warfare. The framework, based upon literature appertaining to 'intra-alliance politics' and International Relations (IR) theories, is applied to the case study of the Normandy Campaign of 1944. Utilising this framework we are able to consider many of the thorny issues of coalition politics and determine how these can be managed successfully to maintain Allied cohesion. Throughout the analysis the merits of the 'realist' and 'pluralist' views on maintaining Allied cohesion are appraised. The article concludes that, while both afford convincing explanations for overcoming tensions within the coalition, the pluralist approach proves superior in accounting for Allied unity. Overall, the article demonstrates that the intra-alliance politics framework is a useful device for understanding the political dynamics of the Normandy Campaign in 1944 and that it is also potentially applicable to other instances of coalition warfare; past, present, and future.
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| 3 |
ID:
133844
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In his book the Anarchical society : A study of order in world politics, Hedley Bull defined international order as a behavior pattern resulting from pursuit of purposes by nations or international community.
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| 4 |
ID:
013091
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| Publication |
Sept 1997.
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| Description |
79-89
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| 5 |
ID:
171207
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| Summary/Abstract |
The conventional wisdom about the 1992 US intervention in Somalia is that it was a quintessentially humanitarian mission pushed by President George H. W. Bush. This article challenges that interpretation, drawing on newly declassified documents. The Somalia intervention, I argue, was largely a pragmatic response to concerns held by the US military. In late 1992, as the small UN mission in Somalia was collapsing, senior American generals worried about being drawn into the resulting vacuum. Hence they reluctantly recommended a robust US intervention, in the expectation that this would allow the UN to assemble a larger peacekeeping force that would take over within months. The intervention ultimately failed, but the military learned useful lessons from this experience on how to achieve smoother UN handoffs in the future and thus effectively shift longer-term stabilisation burdens to the international community.
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