| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Brzezinski preferred to divide Sino-American relations into three parts-bilateral relations, common strategic interests focused on the Soviet threat, and normalization-and he wanted to pursue each on a separate track. He agreed with Vance that progress towards normalization would require a compromise on the future status of Taiwan, but he argued that the Chinese might be less strident on the issue if they became convinced that closer relations with the United States would enhance their own security vis-à-vis the Soviets. In any event, Brzezinski believed that the Chinese were sufficiently concerned about the Soviet threat, that they were interested in ways that the United States might be used to offset that threat, that mutually beneficial relations in some areas could progress ahead of the normalization process if necessary. In that context, he was eager to demonstrate progress in Sino-American relations in part as a signal to the Soviets to help them understand the value of "restraint and reciprocity
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