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ID:
090661
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the attempt of President Richard M. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger to gain domestic acceptance of the grand design and grand strategy they developed for American foreign policy during the period they were in office, with particular emphasis on the concept of policy legitimation. This article draws on extensive secondary accounts, memoirs, archival materials, and the author's interviews and own previously published, related work.
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| 2 |
ID:
038678
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| Publication |
Ludhiana, Lyall Book Depot, 1967.
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| Description |
viii, 326p.Hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 012452 | 923.173/MAZ 012452 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
099940
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| 4 |
ID:
122049
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article follows the last 72 hours of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War; that is, the three days from the collapse of the first ceasefire, on 23 October, until 25 October, when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, which ended the war, was adopted. The goal is to present and analyse the interests of the United States and how it managed its policy vis-à-vis Israel and Egypt during the ceasefire imbroglio. However, the article devotes special attention to the serious crisis with the Soviet Union that played out during those fateful hours. It stemmed from the note sent by the leader of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, to US President Richard M. Nixon on 24 October. From the contents of the message, senior American decision-makers concluded that the Soviets were planning the unilateral deployment of an armed force to the Middle East. In response to this threat, these officials decided to raise the state of alert of the American armed forces to Level 3. The main conclusion of the research, however, is that no real Soviet threat existed. On the contrary, the Soviet Union was interested in preserving détente and in continuing to cooperate with the United States in order to put an end to the violence in the Middle East.
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| 5 |
ID:
047125
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| Publication |
Pasadena, Salem Press INC, 2000.
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| Description |
2v. (xx, 419-838p.)Hbk
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| Series |
Magill's Choice
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| Contents |
Vol. II.: William Lyon Mackenzie King-Boris Yeltsin
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| Standard Number |
0893563374
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044333 | 920/SAL 044333 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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