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| 1 |
ID:
090668
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Security meant holding the Soviet Union militarily and politically at bay so that behind the shield afforded by American power, western Europe, with West Germany firmly entrenched in a liberaldemocraticmarket-economic community, could recover, flourish, and never threaten anyone again. And so NATO did all three things, making it one of the most successful alliances in history. Canadian diplomats and politicians who heard Ismay's formulation no doubt agreed with it. Canada had a fundamental interest in European security. During the 20th century, Canada saw as vital to its interests the prevention of any single power from dominating Europe-first Germany, against which Canada went to war twice, and then the Soviet Union. Today, Canada has a fundamental interest in defeating Islamist terror. To this end, Canada is playing a leading role in NATO's efforts in Afghanistan.
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| 2 |
ID:
106521
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| 3 |
ID:
156927
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do democratic allies manage their participation in U.S.-led coalition operations? This article compares the Canadian and Dutch management of domestic and international expectations of support to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It argues that the decision whether to support coalition operations often does not amount to a simplistic “yes” or “no” answer. It entails a management process involving several strategies, as well as a wide range of mutually inclusive support options. Canadian and Dutch management of support to coalition operations reveals that similarly core U.S. allies misunderstood U.S. expectations, mismanaged their country's stance by sending confusing signals to both their domestic and international audiences, and adopted varied trade-off strategies. The study of multinational coalition operations should thus conceptualize political and military support separately, but examine their causal interrelationships and measure them on a qualitative, case-specific continuum, in order to properly understand the variations and trade-offs involved in the allied management of support to military coalitions.
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| 4 |
ID:
138284
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the current Canadian discussion of missile defence, it is often claimed that the future of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is under threat and that it will be saved only if Canada opts in. The command does not need saving, however. Any such claim draws attention away from the real North American defence challenges that Canadians need to face in a debate about continental strategic defence: whether or not Canada needs to be protected by a missile defence system (a point that a Senate committee strongly emphasized in 2014) and what Ottawa needs to do about its own air defences that fall under NORAD.
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