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| 1 |
ID:
087821
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the notion of so-called decisive victory, and the apparent relationship between battlefield victory and strategic success. It argues that there is no necessary causal relationship between what happens on the battlefield and the eventual outcomes of wars. It further argues that the Revolution in Military Affairs, because it appears to render battlefield success so much more attainable, further complicates muddled strategic thinking on these issues, and may actually be counter-productive to strategic success.
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| 2 |
ID:
087823
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines 'Fourth Generation Warfare' (4GW), a theory of how warfare has evolved and is evolving, from the perspective of military history. The author makes three primary claims: 4GW advocates' boxing of history into 'generations' is logically and temporally inconsistent; 4GW authors misuse history by selectively choosing case studies and applying them out of context; and other arguments regarding the current and future character of warfare are more convincing. The author concludes that scholars and policymakers would be well served by considering elements of 4GW, particularly its analysis of insurgency, but that the concept should be subsumed by a broader US grand strategy that retains a strong focus on preparation for conventional warfare.
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| 3 |
ID:
087824
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the Dhofar campaign in Oman (1965-75), and the role Britain played in assisting the Omani royal government against left-wing insurgents. Using existing secondary sources and declassified British government papers, it reassesses the contribution of British military advisers and special forces to the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the balance between military action and civil affairs, the external dimension of the conflict, and intelligence and covert operations. It concludes by assessing whether the Dhofar War offers any guidance to Western armed forces involved in contemporary COIN campaigns such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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| 4 |
ID:
087822
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the last 18 years or so, much of the debate about modern warfare has been about whether it should be described as 'old' or 'new'. However, there has not been a definitive answer as to which best reflects war in the modern world. Increasingly, the alternative arguments are polarised into opposing camps. Indeed, it would be fair to say that there is little in the way of debate at all. By revaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each argument, this paper aims to reinvigorate that discussion by examining whether changes in the way we understand war are really required. Finding that the ideas are not in fact mutually exclusive, it suggests that future research could benefit from a combined approach.
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| 5 |
ID:
087825
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While the importance of indigenous forces for successful counterinsurgency operations has long been recognized by great powers fighting local insurgencies, the factors that determine the performance of such forces have attracted relatively little scholarly attention. This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of those determinants through an examination of the role and performance of auxiliary indigenous units in French counterinsurgency operations during the Algerian War (1954-62). The findings presented here suggest some important lessons for those seeking to recruit and deploy effective indigenous forces in counterinsurgency operations.
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