| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
091405
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent events have made Moscow's attempts to preserve its exclusive regional control seem no longer feasible or cost-effective.
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| 2 |
ID:
125343
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Putin's efforts to reassert his leadership have created new problems while merely sweeping old ones under the rug.
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| 3 |
ID:
129775
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| 4 |
ID:
132146
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Civilians are dying?.?.?.?in South Ossetia?.?.?.?the majority of them are citizens of the Russian federation.?.?.?.?We will not leave unpunished the deaths of our compatriots. The guilty parties have brought upon themselves the punishment they deserved." This announcement about the invasion of Georgia's territory came from then Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in August 2008. Medvedev was firm, citing the Russian Constitution and federal law, but while it was his lips moving, the words were clearly those of Vladimir Putin.
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| 5 |
ID:
091948
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| 6 |
ID:
105270
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| 7 |
ID:
115605
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With an elite that seeks only to protect its own interests, and without any alternative force in society, crisis is the only thing capable of stirring the swamp.
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| 8 |
ID:
112155
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay is based on a close reading of speeches and other public statements made by Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev during their presidencies, covering the period 2000-2010. It argues that the pattern of presidential discourse reveals that both presidents have regarded Russia's nuclear weapons as primarily political rather than military instruments. Both Putin and Medvedev demonstrated a sustained desire to pursue strategic nuclear arms reductions through negotiations, particularly on a bilateral basis with the United States, and an interest in minimum nuclear deterrence. The shifts in position taken by both presidents on US plans for missile defence in particular reveal that they each attached as much, if not more, importance to Russia being regarded as an equal partner by the United States than to any strategic gains that might be achieved through preventing the deployment of an effective missile defence system.
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| 9 |
ID:
108205
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| 10 |
ID:
109555
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AT LAST fall's Valdai Discussion Club, the annual Moscow session where Russian leaders meet with Western journalists and academics, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin made clear he would issue no apologies for his recent maneuver to reclaim the Russian presidency from his protégé, Dmitri Medvedev, and dominate his country's politics for perhaps the next dozen years. Responding to one question, he declared, "I do not need to prove anything to anyone."
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| 11 |
ID:
112168
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| 12 |
ID:
090944
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the aftermath of the 2008 Georgian war, President Dmitri Medvedev, setting out Russia's foreign policy principles, spoke about the country's spheres of "privileged interests" and the government's obligation to defend Russian citizens abroad.1 Coming less than a month after Russia's armed response to Georgia's attack on its breakaway province of South Ossetia, where most residents had been provided with Russian passports, this statement produced a shock. It sounded as if Moscow was reclaiming the Soviet geopolitical legacy of Russia's spheres of influence and was prepared to intervene with force in countries with significant ethnic Russian minorities. The talk of Russian assertiveness, making rounds since the mid-2000s, was substantially enhanced by accusations of Russia's outright aggressive behavior.
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