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| 1 |
ID:
087612
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The idea that the United States is an empire or should adopt imperial strategies has been widely criticized. One of the most persuasive sets of arguments against imperial enthusiasts is that empire is an obsolete and outdated strategy. Both systemic- and domestic-level changes are said to prevent the United States from successfully implementing an imperial strategy. I maintain that the importance of these barriers-whether technological, economic, or ideational-are greatly overstated. In contrast, I point to a number of developments, such as the rise of nontraditional security threats, the revolution in military affairs, and changing norms of humanitarian intervention, that will encourage greater American overseas adventurism.
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| 2 |
ID:
087611
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, we argued that the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel is due largely to the influence of a domestic interest group-comprised of Jews as well as non-Jews-and that this unusual situation is harmful to both the United States and Israel. Jerome Slater's thoughtful review endorses many of our central arguments, but it also highlights several points of disagreement. He argues that we overlooked important alternative sources, defined the lobby too broadly, and exaggerated its influence on Congress and especially the Executive Branch. Although Slater is even more critical of U.S. Middle East policy than we are, he argues that the special relationship is due to strong cultural and religious affinities and broad public support in American society, and not to the influence of the lobby. In fact, the alternative sources cited by Slater do not undermine our basic claims; a broad conception of the lobby makes more sense than his narrower definition; and there is little disagreement between us about the lobby's influence on Capitol Hill or in the White House. Most importantly, public opinion in the United States does not explain why the United States gives Israel such extensive and nearly unconditional backing. Although most Americans have a favorable image of Israel, surveys show that they also favor a more even-handed Middle East policy and a more normal relationship with Israel. Thus, the special relationship is due primarily to the lobby's influence, and not to the American people's enduring identification with the Jewish state.
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| 3 |
ID:
087614
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, it challenges the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that "nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced" among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, this article notes that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises. Instead, nonnuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have averted such an escalation. The article concludes by noting that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a U.S. approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term.
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| 4 |
ID:
087610
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's controversial book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy1 (hereafter, Israel Lobby), is one of the most important foreign policy works of our times. It can be understood, in effect, to be two different books: one on the U.S. foreign policy process concerning the Middle East in general and Israel in particular, the other on the substance of those policies. The book's central argument that the Israel lobby dominates the U.S. Middle East policy process has attracted almost all the attention of the critics, and while many of the criticisms are overstated or even vicious, the argument is indeed problematic in several ways. Unfortunately, the controversy over the Mearsheimer/Walt argument about the power of the Israel lobby has resulted in a general ignoring of their more important "second book," the far-ranging and mostly compelling critique of the substance of U.S. policies in the Middle East.
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