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| 1 |
ID:
102171
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| 2 |
ID:
090951
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nearly all campuses are determining ways by which they could internationalize the curriculum to connect their campus with the world. While study abroad programs are quite common, a less used mechanism that makes this important connection is a global leadership program. At the University of Utah, one innovative program is the International Leadership Academy, which integrates globalization into a class that provides students with conceptual skills as they enter a global market. This article discusses the design and implementation of a program that connects globalization and leadership. The ILA not only prepares students to make use of the many international opportunities in Utah, but exposes them to competing theories and explanations of international leadership.
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| 3 |
ID:
130967
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Australia's victory in securing temporary seats on the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Executive Board has been much celebrated. This provides an important platform for Australia to further the agenda of women's rights worldwide. As part of this agenda, Australia has provided a commitment to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security through the development of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018, released in 2012. This article examines the early thoughts and efforts towards the implementation of this plan. It demonstrates that while there is a broad rhetorical commitment to implementation by Australian actors, there are nonetheless challenges that may threaten its success. Based in part upon interviews with Australian government representatives and policy makers, and activists and advocates of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, this article highlights the success, challenges and opportunities that have so far been associated with implementing this important Resolution.
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| 4 |
ID:
107285
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2011.
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Since the end of the Cold War, fast-paced globalization has increased interaction among states and promoted development of international norms in many fields. Constructivists argue that international interactions can only advance international norms towards a Kantian culture of friendly mutual help and could not propel any regression to a Hobbesian culture of hostile confrontation.1 We can observe, however, that the reality of international politics does not support this argument. Although certain interactions have promoted international cooperation, others have intensified international conflicts. For instance, China, the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea held during the five years from August 2003 to December 2008 seven rounds of Six Party Talks on nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula. The six nations' continuous interaction during this period, however, resulted not in North Korea's acceptance of the norm of non-proliferation, but in its conducting on May 25 2009 its second nuclear test.2 This example calls to question whether or not interaction among states drives international norms in one specific direction. Drawing on the Pre-Qin philosophers' idea that the type of monarch has different impacts on relations among states, this article analyses how the different types of leadership of a leading power influence the process and direction of evolution of international norms.
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| 5 |
ID:
165734
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In recent years much attention has been given to the ongoing rise of China and its potential consequences for the extant international order. Less attention, however, has been given to the possibility of a US withdrawal from its role at the center of the order it helped to create. Since the election of Donald Trump, however, the prospect of a "leadership vacuum," caused by American policies that seek to dismantle, weaken, or ignore various international institutions, has become an increasingly important issue. In this article we explore the historical nature of US hegemony and the factors that may be encouraging the Trump administration to abandon America's leadership role. We also consider the factors that may inhibit China from offering an alternative. Consequently, we argue that international order in the near future may be defined by a lack of leadership rather than a hegemonic transition.
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| 6 |
ID:
130966
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2014.
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In the bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the Australian government emphasised international peace and security and Indigenous peoples as two of the eight key elements supporting its nomination. Australia's positive track record in support of the UN Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, including the delivery of an Australian National Action Plan (NAP) along with recognition of historical injustices to Indigenous Australians, was highlighted as a valid and important argument in favour of its nomination. The Australian NAP, however, has all but ignored the local context in its development and application, focusing instead on its commitments abroad. This framing of the Australian NAP is informed, firstly, by the WPS agenda policy framework applying to conflict and post-conflict situations, and, secondly, by its location within the UN mandate, requiring those situations to be internationally recognised. This article applies Nancy Fraser's tripartite justice framework to reveal that the Australian NAP gives rise to the political injustice of 'misrepresentation' in relation to intra-state (violent), domestically situated Indigenous-settler relations, which are denied the status of ongoing internationally recognised conflict. The author suggests that the remedy to this injustice is to reframe and recognise the conflict status of Indigenous-settler relations in the localisation of the Australian NAP. This localisation creates openings for Indigenous Australian women to engage with the WPS agenda in meaningful ways.
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| 7 |
ID:
130968
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2014.
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How has the Women, Peace and Security agenda been advanced in the Pacific Islands? While some observers argue that this region suffers from a contagion of unrest, violence and state weakness, these estimates commonly ignore the vital work women have performed in the region as promoters of peace and security. Even when such activity places them in direct personal danger, women across the region have spearheaded efforts to bridge communal boundaries and challenge the increasing normalisation of violence, gendered and otherwise, that accompanies threatened or actual incidents of conflict. As this article demonstrates, these efforts have had profound impacts on the ground in conflict-affected Pacific Island countries. They have also received increased recognition at the level of institutional politics, with member states of the Pacific Islands Forum recently accepting a Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. This has been hailed as a significant achievement for the region's women peacebuilders. But much of this plan is focused on women's contributions to peacebuilding at the pointy end of a crisis. This overlooks the extent to which the 'slow violence' of environmental degradation, masculinised politics and militarism also compound gendered insecurity in the region. Attention to these issues offers a contradictory picture of the gains made in promoting the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Pacific Islands. While this advocacy framework has provided important opportunities for the region's women peacebuilders, it may also have discouraged broader reflection on the prevailing structural conditions at work across the region which function in an attenuated fashion to undermine women's security and the achievement of a gendered regional peace.
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| 8 |
ID:
130703
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2014.
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This article contributes to the literature on global governance, legitimacy, and small states through a detailed analysis of the Global Governance Group. It examines in particular the operational impact and wider conceptual implications of the 3G's collective diplomatic efforts on the Group of 20. By engaging in a reconfigured form of informal multilateralism, the article finds that the 3G has been and is capable of shaping the global agenda with respect to the G-20 in a way that is both more inclusive and connected with existing institutions, especially the United Nations. Through this initiative, this group has effectively recalibrated the existing narrative about small states, the G-20, and global governance-shifting it from the paradigm of efficiency to one of legitimacy.
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| 9 |
ID:
162295
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Oxon, Routledge, 2018.
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| Description |
432p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9781857439571
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059550 | 355.40723/RED 059550 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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| 10 |
ID:
130970
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2014.
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Many conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region have included sexual violence crimes targeted primarily against women. However, in comparison to other regions, Asia-Pacific states have been reluctant to embrace international law innovations to end impunity for such crimes into the future, as evidenced by their unwillingness to become signatories to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Of the 39 countries constituting the Asia-Pacific region, only 17-less than half-have joined the Rome Statute. This article initially surveys some of the reasons for non-ratification of the Statute. It further examines the role of civil society and the potential normative impact of the Statute to enhance national sexual violence legislation and prosecutions. Finally, it identifies some practical steps that the Australian government could take to encourage regional states to ratify, implement and enforce the Rome Statute in order to further protect all victims of international crimes and bolster the broader Women, Peace and Security framework.
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| 11 |
ID:
137409
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Once only coordinating the foreign policy of its member states, the European Union (EU) now endeavors to speak on behalf of non-EU states. In the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), its declarations are often backed by a large number of countries. This article enquires into the function of diplomatic alignment. Its findings question the use of alignment as a normative benchmark for European integration. It argues that adherence to EU norms is not the only rationale for alignment, and, more interestingly, that there are valid reasons not to align, which do not contradict EU norms, as well as more questionable reasons to align, which do. This article, in conclusion, argues that the function of alignment supports the EU's claim for international leadership, and that the reactions of non-EU states should be gaged in the light of this venture.
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| 12 |
ID:
130965
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2014.
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What is the 'Women, Peace and Security agenda' and why is it relevant now for Australia? During 2013-14, Australia is a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and, with a growing foreign military, peacebuilding and aid presence around the world, the country must play a role in preventing conflict, in protecting women and girls from violence before, during and after conflict, and in encouraging the participation of women in these peace and security decisions in order to create the structural, gender-equal conditions for lasting peace. This article highlights the promises made by Australia during the campaign for the Security Council seat. It evaluates the credibility of the campaign commitments by assessing Australia's foreign policies and overseas aid spending on women and peacebuilding in Asia and the Pacific; exploring the avenues for government-funded research on women, peace and security issues to influence government policies and programs; and taking stock of the government's record of engaging with civil society in developing and carrying out its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. The article suggests concrete actions that would allow Australia to fulfil its promises and progress its international leadership on the major pillars of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.
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| 13 |
ID:
130969
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat and its member states have repeatedly professed their commitment to the protection and advancement of women's economic and human rights. Such commitments have included the Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region in 1988, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in the ASEAN Region in 2004, and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012, as well as the establishment of the ASEAN Committee on Women in 2002 and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Women and Children in 2009. However, none of these regional commitments or institutions expressly take up the core concern of the Women, Peace and Security agenda set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. ASEAN has no 1325 regional action plan and, amongst the ASEAN membership, the Philippines is the only state that has adopted a 1325 National Action Plan. The authors explore the possible reasons for the lack of ASEAN institutional engagement with 1325, outline the case for regional engagement, and suggest specific roles for the ASEAN Secretariat, donor governments and individual member states to commit to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 as a regional priority.
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