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ID:
091063
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article takes issue with the frequently-made assertion that Al Qaeda cannot be deterred from employing weapons of mass destruction. It argues that Al Qaeda's leadership employs terroristic violence in a manner calculated to achieve a set of political goals. They are, in other words, rational actors who are sensitive to the potential costs and benefits associated with their actions, and thus are to some extent deterrable. The article examines a number of ways in which the lack of discrimination and proportionality associated with weapons of mass destruction might be expected to produce more problems than benefits for Al Qaeda and thus deter their use. It also considers some ways in which the West might seek to bolster these deterrent effects.
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| 2 |
ID:
093714
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In neighbouring countries like Russia and Kazakhstan, resource nationalism that may look similar to outside observers has a different character and is driven by different circumstances in each state. To assess the underlying nature of state-centric models of resource-led development in the two post-Soviet states, we contrast recent state interventions into their respective resource sectors. In Russia, heightened state involvement in the resource sectors, including oil and gas pipeline networks, is characterised mainly by political goals, whereas Kazakhstan's resource nationalism is primarily motivated by economic goals. More specifically, Russia leverages its energy sector to achieve geopolitical objectives and domestic political stability. By contrast, Kazakhstan seeks widely dispersed economic development.
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| 3 |
ID:
129208
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Almost twenty-five years ago, the political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. coined the term "soft power" to capture the influence that the United States exercises not through coercion or inducement but through attraction. Coercion and inducement-the stick and the carrot-are forms of command power (or what Nye calls "hard power"), delivered via economic, diplomatic, or military instruments. Command power is used to compel or bribe others to do what you want them to do. Soft power, in contrast, is less a policy instrument to be wielded than an indirect force; it emanates from the attractiveness of a state's culture, political values, and foreign policies. Soft power encourages other international actors to cooperate with a state (or a multistate organization like the European Union) to pursue what they perceive as shared goals and values. It is therefore a less costly means of attaining desired outcomes than the use of command power.
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| 4 |
ID:
133756
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2014.
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This study uses quantitative methods to explore how the memory of Katyn is mobilised in political discourse. The scholarly literature on memory conflict tends to see international memory disputes as an expression of a state's interests as a whole; this study analyses when hostile rhetoric is mobilised and finds that in Poland Katyn is invoked as part of an opposition strategy that criticises the incumbent regime for undermining the national interest. Periods of accelerated debate about the significance of Katyn have occurred as political elites sought to achieve specific domestic rather than foreign political goals.
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| 5 |
ID:
128303
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
'Mowing the Grass', Israel's strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.
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| 6 |
ID:
139289
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As globalization of the world economy increases, the scope of intellectual migration continues to spread. One of its forms is student or educational migration—a phenomenon that largely dates to the end of the 20th century and has not been sufficiently studied so far. As for Kyrgyzstan, this is essentially the first time intellectual and student migration has been studied.
Any migration, including intellectual, undermines a country’s national potential. It should also be kept in mind that the host countries use migrants to achieve specific ideological and political goals.
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| 7 |
ID:
109150
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2011.
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This article describes a number of possible existential motivations for engaging in terrorism. Three in particular are identified: (1) the desire for excitement, (2) the desire for ultimate meaning, and (3) the desire for glory. Terrorism, according to the argument set out here, is as much a site of individual self-drama and self-reinvention as a tactical instrument for pursuing the political goals of small groups. The conclusion explores the concept of "existential frustration," and suggests that terrorist activity may provide an outlet for basic existential desires that cannot find expression through legitimate channels.
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| 8 |
ID:
115883
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2012.
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The objective of this article is to critically analyse the discourse within the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or known as UCPN (Maoist) since its evolution and find out whether the Maoists have adapted themselves to the democratic process well by using democracy as a tool to achieve their own revolutionary political objectives. The article argues that the internal Maoist discourse reflects that there is no change in the UCPN (Maoist) strategy or political goals. They have only changed their tactics to suit the situation. The changes are also more visible at the organisational rather than the ideological level. Since the party is in transition, they may not opt for another round of violent revolution to achieve their political objectives; they will try their best to achieve them through peaceful means. Since the party has already experimented with the radicals' ideas in 2004-2005, the top leaders will be extra careful in the future about letting the radicals dominate the party.
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