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| 1 |
ID:
110805
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Previous research on environment and security has contested the existence, nature and significance of a climate driver of conflict. In this study, we have focused on small-scale conflict over East Africa where the link between resource availability and conflict is assumed to be more immediate and direct. Using the parameter of rainfall variability to explore the marginal influence of the climate on conflict, the article shows that in locations that experience rebel or communal conflict events, the frequency of these events increases in periods of extreme rainfall variation, irrespective of the sign of the rainfall change. Further, these results lend support to both a 'zero-sum' narrative, where conflicting groups use force and violence to compete for ever-scarcer resources, and an 'abundance' narrative, where resources spur rent-seeking/wealth-seeking and recruitment of people to participate in violence. Within the context of current uncertainty regarding the future direction of rainfall change over much of Africa, these results imply that small-scale conflict is likely to be exacerbated with increases in rainfall variability if the mean climate remains largely unchanged; preferentially higher rates of rebel conflict will be exhibited in anomalously dry conditions, while higher rates of communal conflict are expected in increasingly anomalous wet conditions.
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| 2 |
ID:
138307
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| Summary/Abstract |
Our article analyzes how transitioning political institutions create incentives and disincentives for opposition groups to incite different forms of political violence. We argue that variation on two specific parameters of governance—checks and balances and political participation—compels states toward one of the three forms of conflict, including civil wars, political militia, and riots. Using disaggregated data on different types of political violence across Africa from 1997 to 2012, we analyzed two parameters of governance in both count and change models. We also identified high-risk conflict periods. Typical regime types (democracy, autocracy, anocracy) cannot explain manifestations of conflict, as violence occurs in regimes with varying levels of political openness and competition. Opposition groups actively respond to regime transitions, as changes in institutional parameters correlate with shifts into alternative forms of violence within states.
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| 3 |
ID:
172192
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| Summary/Abstract |
Pro-government militias (PGMs) are armed, political organizations that assist regime and state elites through illicit violence. This article considers how and where to situate militias within larger frameworks of political violence and its emerging contexts. Pro-government militias have increased in recent years, along with their participation in conflict events, including those resulting in fatalities. This is in step with increases in domestic political competition and regime fragmentation across developing states. Using a new PGM dataset that collects discrete events perpetrated by these groups across Africa from 1997–2016, two conclusions are reached: PGM groups are more active outside of civil war periods than within, and their actions and numbers have increased as more countries transition to democracy. Further, activity by PGMs is not well explained by government attempts to delegate violence for reputational reasons or low capacity. Political fragmentation at the national level and diffuse opposition threats better account for the spatial and temporal patterns of PGM activity.
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| 4 |
ID:
183701
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| Summary/Abstract |
Conflict across African states has often been linked to ethnic-based biases in government, and exclusive policies. However, the domestic politics of developing states, and the elites who contest for power therein, have often been overlooked when explaining the patterns and risk of disorder and violence. We consider how African leaders practice politics in whom to represent, and at what level. These choices have consequences as how regimes accommodate political elites creates different competitive conditions which, in turn, create incentives and opportunities for political violence. Using a dataset on cabinet appointments over twenty years, we find that high levels of elite political inclusion and mal-apportionment in positions is consistently associated with increases in non-state violence. Power distribution levels among those groups included in senior positions account for more political violence than that which stems from exclusive politics.
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| 5 |
ID:
095631
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| 6 |
ID:
091067
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the link between subnational poverty and the location of civil war events. Drawing on the ACLED dataset, which breaks internal conflicts down to individual events at the local level, we take a disaggregated approach to the study of conflict. Local-level socioeconomic data are taken from the Liberian Demographic and Health Survey. With geographical cells of approximately 76 km 2 as units of analysis, we test how absolute and relative welfare affect the presence and number of conflict events during the 1989-2002 Liberian civil war. We control for neighboring conflict events, distance to Monrovia and national borders, population density, diamond deposits, and ethnic affiliations. War events were more frequent in the richer locations. This may provide better support for "opportunity" explanations than for "relative deprivation" theories of conflict, but we argue that the relative weakness of the Liberian government makes it difficult to distinguish between the two.
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| 7 |
ID:
143346
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| Summary/Abstract |
Across African states, militias have become one of the main agents of political violence, accounting for a third of all recent conflict. Militia violence is attributed to cultural reactions to disorder, failing and predatory states, and local cleavages which emerge during civil wars. However, activity largely occurs in democratizing states without civil wars. This article presents a typology of militias based on their local roles and actions and an explanation for the prevalence of “competition militias.” Changes in macro politics ushered in a new era of conflict and fragmentation among political elites; militias operate as private armies for these elites. The goal of this violence is to alter the political landscape, increase power for patrons, protect supportive communities, and hinder opponents. Incentives within African democratic institutions reward the use of force by elites. As a result, African democracies, and states transitioning into democracy, are not likely to be internally peaceful. Futhermore, the dominant type of conflict across African states shifts to accommodate the goals of violent agents within modern political contexts.
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| 8 |
ID:
181831
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article applies a regime cycle framework to understand patterns of change and continuity in African competitive autocracies. We observe that regime change in African autocracies is rarely the result of actions carried out by rebels, opposition leaders or popular masses substantially altering the structure of power. Instead, they are more frequently carried out by senior regime cadres, resulting in controlled reshuffles of power. We argue that such regime shifts are best explained through a cyclical logic of elite collective action consisting of accommodation and consolidation, and ultimately leading to fragmentation and crisis. These dynamics indicate the stage of leader-elite relationships at a given time, and suggest when regimes may likely expand, contract, purge and fracture. We argue that, by acknowledging in which stage of the cycle a regime and its senior elites are dominant, we can gauge the likelihood as well as the potential success of a regime change. Our framework is finally applied to understand recent regime shifts in competitive autocracies across Africa.
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| 9 |
ID:
185370
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| 10 |
ID:
137789
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis of urban political violence across Africa considers why the proportion and frequency of conflict is increasing in urban areas while decreasing in rural areas. The decline of formally organized violence in predominantly rural areas, and the increase of more variegated forms of political opposition and conflict in urban zones, is interrogated through demographic and grievance-based explanations. Urban violence displays a range of agents, goals, intensities, and triggers and is alternatively regarded as a response to the lack of capacity and poor governance found in urban contexts, or to the changing demographic and political character of African states. Yet, the multiple, low-intensity forms of urban violence present—including militia attacks, communal contests, riots, and protests—indicate a change in the collective action capabilities and goals of modern conflict agents. These goals are themselves shaped by the experience of mounting urban grievances, but the ethnic and regional heterogeneity in urban areas prevents substantial collective action to counter the urban marginalization practiced by many African governments. Despite the low-intensity nature of urban threats, this compounded violence is a substantial security threat across developing states and is leading to the rise of the “fragile city.”
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| 11 |
ID:
153659
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This analysis illustrates how violence patterns are shaped by local power concentrations. Disaggregated conflict analysis has led to major advances into understanding conflict trends, agents, and dynamics of violence but has not been matched by studies of disaggregated politics, in particular on the subnational level. This analysis details how conflict event location, frequency, and intensity is largely determined by levels of customary authority and development; while armed group bases and control networks are established in areas characterized by weak, co-opted local authorities, wealth generation possibilities, and proximity to other network nodes. This demonstrates that dominant opposition groups co-opt local elites and target those who cannot be easily co-opted or belong to alternative networks. Manifestations of conflict are therefore not well explained by the typically static resource, poverty, or state capacity measures. Local politics and customary authority determine where government, rebels, and militias dare to tread. Sierra Leone Local–Location Event Dataset—a new disaggregated data set on the Sierra Leone war and local source feature of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data—provides substantial evidence for our subnational conflict explanations.
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