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| 1 |
ID:
109427
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| 2 |
ID:
091132
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides an in-depth exploration and examination of operations against and around Post 11 as part of the Australian assault on Bardia. Despite the interesting nature of such operations in their own right, it aims at more than simply recounting details of this remarkable action. Events in and around Post 11 some 67 years ago provide a number of salutary lessons for modern commanders. In particular, the destructive effects of inflated ego and personal pride, stubbornness in the face of commonsense, command negligence and tactical incompetence are brought to the fore. These types of problems are as timeless as they are dangerous. Post 11 is what happens when they reign unchecked.
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| 3 |
ID:
116787
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the importance of the German invasion of Greece in 1941, relatively little research has been conducted into the campaign's operational aspects, and a number of misunderstandings or misinterpretations have developed. One of the most powerful misconceptions was that the huge disparity in airpower, particularly dive-bombers, made it impossible for British and Dominion troops to hold the German advance. This article demonstrates, however, that despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the Luftwaffe did not have the decisive role in the campaign that has so often been ascribed to it.
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| 4 |
ID:
123035
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is no question that the First Libyan Campaign of 1940-41 was a military disaster for Italy. However, for all of the ethnic slurs and cultural stereotyping levelled at Italian military performance in North Africa by historians and popular authors alike, relatively little research effort invested into identifying the real military disadvantages under which Mussolini's soldiers in this theatre fought. When understood as a product of measurable and objective military factors, like the issue of leadership for example, the rout of the 10th Army takes on an entirely new complexion. The subsequent reputation of Italian soldiers as embarrassing battlefield liabilities in the Western Desert in this period is exposed as unfair. This overlooks the handicaps they fought under, and often ignores the bravery displayed in spite of them all. Like the Australians, the Italians in the Western Desert were ordinary men, no more and no less. In truth, it is singularly unsurprising that so many were killed or surrendered without putting up much real resistance. They faced challenges and conditions that would have handicapped troops from any country.
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