| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The absence of active Anglo-American cooperation in the late 1930s contributed to an international environment in which Adolf Hitler could maneuver, capitalizing on Neville Chamberlain's zeal for an Anglo-German settlement of outstanding grievances. The reasons for this estrangement included British suspicion of America's power, intentions, and reliability, manifested notably in U.S. rejection of the League of Nations and withdrawal from the 1933 London Economic Conference. British war debt default and failure to coordinate a response in Manchuria angered Americans. Finally, mutual erection of tariff walls and-especially-both peoples' desire to avoid war imposed domestic political constraints.1 Any conventional summary of Anglo-American relations in this era includes reference to the lack of personal affinity between Franklin Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain. In 1936, Roosevelt had remarked, "We must recognize that he thoroughly dislikes Americans." In December 1937, Chamberlain told his sister, "It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans except words" and advised the cabinet, "the Power that had the greatest strength was the USA, but he would be a rash man who based his calculations on help from that quarter."2 These attitudes were influential. Unpublished private letters from Geoffrey Thompson, an official in the Foreign Office's American Department recently recalled from Spain, to Claude Bowers, U.S. ambassador to Spain, help illustrate the importance of mistrust and the obstacles to a different path in the winter of 1938-1939.
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