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ID:
100587
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the central questions of the 2009 Iranian Presidential Election crisis has been the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This article argues that what we are witnessing goes beyond the institution of the IRGC to the unmasking of a new faction in Iranian politics, which has been overtly (through elections) and covertly (through penetration of state institutions and the economy) transforming power in the Islamic Republic of Iran since at least 2003.
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| 2 |
ID:
091301
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Iranian leadership's handling of the dispute over the June 2009 presidential election not only bitterly alienated a sizeable proportion of the population; it also deeply split the ruling clerics. The government has lost the support of many ranking Islamist figures, whose continued backing is necessary to maintain its coherence and effectiveness, and its legitimacy has been eroded. If it fails to modify its authoritarian Islamist mindset and power structure to claw back some, if not all, of its lost clerical and public support, the scene is set for a greater popular backlash in the long run. The current turmoil, ostensibly sparked by the election results, stems from a confluence of factors, including growing public discontent with the regime's theocratic behaviour, economic mismanagement and foreign-policy embarrassments, especially since Ahmadinejad became president in 2005. These are symptomatic, however, of deeper structural problems in the nature of the Islamic government that has evolved in Iran.
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| 3 |
ID:
129150
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