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| 1 |
ID:
093936
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Even if all essential parties are interested in a negotiated settlement, getting to yes is no sure thing.
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| 2 |
ID:
095514
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| 3 |
ID:
111276
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| 4 |
ID:
023771
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| Publication |
London, B.T. Batsford, 1971.
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| Description |
vii, 333p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 008387 | 923.5611/JAC 008387 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
103767
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the years before and during the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration played an important and often overlooked role in encouraging Britain's disengagement from the Indian subcontinent. Roosevelt's motivations in pressing for Indian independence were varied. They included a mix of principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war and pragmatic jockeying for influence with post-colonial nations when the war was won. Churchill's government was wary of being pushed by Washington to move more quickly to "quit India" than it thought prudent. U.S. policy and actions clearly influenced the direction of events toward independence, but U.S. caution as the war ground on led to disillusionment among nationalist leaders. This reaction would have consequences once swaraj was won and India came into its own, at a time when the Cold War was becoming the dominant factor in America's view of the world.
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| 6 |
ID:
093621
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the diplomatic implications of United States troop movements in Germany before and after V-E Day. Existing accounts emphasize American good will and Soviet refusal to cooperate, pointing to the example of an American convoy en route to Berlin in June 1945. Citing an "agreement" of which the American convoy commander had never heard, the Russians would allow only one-half of his troops to proceed. The agreement did exist, however, and the episode must be seen against the backdrop of Soviet suspicions regarding Western willingness to withdraw from the Soviet occupation zone. United States President Harry S. Truman did overrule British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's calls to link withdrawal to concessions from the Soviets, but he waited two months before doing so. Prior accounts have ignored the delay's effects on Soviet perceptions. The article argues that American actions had the unintended consequence of reinforcing Soviet Chairman Joseph V. Stalin's belief in Western bad faith.
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| 7 |
ID:
164043
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the way in which B.R. Ambedkar attempted to internationalise the problem of untouchability in the years prior to Partition. The move towards the international was an attempt to secure a political space for Dalits as a consequence of the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. Unable to reach an agreement with the likes of Gandhi and Jinnah, Ambedkar looked beyond India for support. His plight gained the attention of disparate people, including Winston Churchill, Jan Smuts and the members of the Indian Conciliation Group. By exploring these events, this article seeks to rescale the history of untouchability and Partition.
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| 8 |
ID:
023803
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| Publication |
Princeton, D Van Nostrand company, inc., 1959.
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| Description |
vii, 322p.Hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 008366 | 923.5/SAN 008366 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
150076
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis critiques the impact of President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” initiative on Washington’s alliance with Britain, itself a newly crowned nuclear state. Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s taste for personal diplomacy led him to support his friend’s proposal without real consideration for how the contributions of fissionable materials and manpower demanded by the scheme would damage Britain’s overstretched domestic nuclear project. Membership of an international atomic agency allowed Britain to reaffirm its global status whilst depleting the resources needed to develop its native technology. In turn, the article discusses the commercial challenge posed by American nuclear firms and highlights how reactor exports quickly became a contest between the quality of British research and the quantity of American subsidies. In this way, it establishes how “Atoms for Peace” prejudiced both Britain’s domestic nuclear effort and export potential, in turn shedding light on Washington’s relations with an ailing Great Power.
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| 10 |
ID:
116786
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article looks afresh at the decision by Britain to despatch an expeditionary force to Greece in 1941 to oppose the much-anticipated decision by Hitler, to end by German invasion the inept Italian campaign against Athens. The existing work on this topic emphasises the geo-political motives behind the campaign, especially Churchill's need to impress American public opinion by going to the aid of the Greeks, often with an assumption that British military leaders committed themselves to the venture against their better judgement. What these accounts overlook is what British planners thought was operationally possible. This article is based on new archival research, which indicates that key British leaders, throughout the chain of command, thought Greek topography would prevent the Wehrmacht from repeating the success of armoured warfare achieved by the Germans in France. In considering this material, the article sheds new light on the failure of British military leaders to fully understand the possibilities of armoured warfare, and thus adds to our understanding of the doctrinal reasons for poor British battlefield performance in the 1940-42 period more generally.
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| 11 |
ID:
148374
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| Publication |
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.
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| Description |
xvi, 429p.: plates, mapspbk
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| Standard Number |
9780199678501
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058855 | 359.0309410904/BEL 058855 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
099257
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| 13 |
ID:
170155
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| Summary/Abstract |
Eighty years ago, World War II broke out in Europe. Remembering this anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on what we might learn from studying the history of that hideous era. Of the many accounts on the war's origins, Winston Churchill offered one of the most insightful interpretations about how a return of great-power competition shattered Europe's peace. His condemnation of Great Britain's leaders for seeking to appease the Nazi dictator offers a sobering lesson in the failure of the world's democracies to arm themselves and band together to preserve the peace. Churchill lamented that democracy had been weighed in the balance and found wanting. His lamentation still serves as a warning against the folly of military weakness and foreign policy isolation.
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| 14 |
ID:
099722
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| Publication |
Chennai, Tranquebar Press, 2010.
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| Description |
xxxvi, 352p.Pbk
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| Standard Number |
9789380658476
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055355 | 940.542141/MUK 055355 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
100191
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE STATE ARCHIVES of the city of Sevastopol contains documentary photographs pertaining to the city's history. Last year we found, among the negatives belonging to press photographer M.B. Pokatilo, pictures showing Clementine Churchill, the wife of the British prime minister.
The pictures document her visit to Sevastopol on April 24, 1945. Whereas photographs of the Allied leaders Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at the Yalta Conference have long been well familiar to scholars and the general public, researchers gave her visit to Crimea just a cursory treatment and there, until recently, were no pictures found having to do with the visit.
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| 16 |
ID:
175971
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MY FATHER, Boris Fyodorovich Podtserob, was the senior assistant of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union during the war. This position allowed him to attend a number of historic diplomatic talks. That is how he came to participate in the Yalta Conference. My father did not leave written memoirs, but he used to tell me about the fateful meeting among three of the world's giants.
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| 17 |
ID:
118709
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| 18 |
ID:
038715
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| Publication |
London, William Heinemann ltd, 1983.
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| Description |
xix, 1308p.Hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 026901 | 923.241/GIL 026901 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
110457
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Bush remembers the tragedy of Charles V of Habsburg and Philip II of Spain who strove to keep one world under one sensible hegemony and, despite defeating major adversaries, failed over the stubborn resistance of rebels and heretics then in Holland and yesterday in Iraq - debt and imperial overstretching as predicted by Paul Kennedy.
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| 20 |
ID:
046875
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| Publication |
London, Cassell and Co., 2001.
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| Description |
xxix, 402p.: ill.Pbk
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| Standard Number |
0304358436
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044237 | 923.543/PAD 044237 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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