| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
101029
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
For the Mumbai attacks of 26 November 2008, the Lashakr-e-Taiba recived training, funding and technical gadgets from the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Pakistan, Middle East countries and United States (US) based companies restively. Fomenting insurgencies and supporting terrorism has been a major component of Pakistan's national strategy, especially against India. Yet t Indian security agencies are still badly trained and poorly equipped. Although, global cooperation is essential in combating international terrorism, the US has adopted selective rather than unified and comprehensive cunterterrorism measures to deal with this scourge in South Asia. It is no secret that the real rulers in Pakistan are the army and the ISI and at times they dwarf the civilian government in decision-making. If extremist forces take over Afghanistan and Pakistan, the world will become significantly less secure. However, international cooperation is not an entitlement and India must firs set its own house in order
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
092403
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The emergence of a global new media model aided by the technological revolution of the twenty-first century, economic globalization and political neo-liberalism, has transformed the traditional old model of media as a democratic pillar of public service into a new profit-oriented model of media as a corporate business enterprise primarily dependent on advertisement revenues. This change in the media ownership has had significant negative implications for media coverage and content. In this changed scenario of eclipse of investigative and critical journalism and triumph of infotainment journalism, this new corporate media, especially in the post-9/11 era, has nonetheless made itself particularly vulnerable to the terrorist manipulation of mass media as an advertisement agent for terror. Through the specific case study of the media coverage of Mumbai terror attacks on November 26, 2008, this study attempts to reveal how the commercial agenda of the new media ends up furthering the terrorist agenda, albeit in immediate short run, of inculcating mass hysteria, irrational mob fury directed against the state thereby eroding, however temporarily, popular sovereignty of the state.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
108179
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
096333
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
102314
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
105889
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
122091
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
129938
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
129964
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
104707
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
106891
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
110177
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
100250
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
106890
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
100226
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
106639
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
097973
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
146619
|
|
|
|
|
| Contents |
The Kargil Conflict had fortuitously brought to the centre-stage the need for an integrated approach towards intelligence gathering and joint operations. The 26//11 Mumbai attack has woken us to the reality of a unified approach between the states, the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy. The Defence Procurement Procedures over the years have tried to bring transparency into our procurement process and there have been some moves towards increasing private sector participation in defence manufacturing. However, unlike automotives and telecom sector, the relationship between the DPSUs, the DRDO and the private sector remain uneasy and adversarial. The DPSUs still do not consider the private sector as partners but as contractors.The record of private sector players such as L&T in strategic programmes like that of Arihant is salutary. A defence capability improvement would need major structural change.Either we have a DGA-like structure or the COCO structure of the USA with the government providing oversight on strategic issues.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
095816
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Mumbai attacks have become a symbol of modern terrorism. The gunmen's improvisation, technological superiority and connection to the outside world meant the siege at eight different locations lasted sixty hours. Crucially, the fidayeen had no expectation of survival. The lessons of Mumbai need to be urgently understood before this kind of attack becomes the template for future acts of terrorism.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
116083
|
|
|