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| 1 |
ID:
091398
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the last decade, considerable progress has been made in building up the unique verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to monitor the globe for nuclear explosions.
The CTBT's global alarm system has grown not only quantitatively through the increase in number of monitoring facilities, but also qualitatively. As a result of scientific and technological progress in monitoring technologies, including in the automatic processing of data, the system, although still incomplete, is already more powerful than expected by the treaty's negotiators. Therefore, there is a very high probability today that a militarily significant nuclear test anywhere on the planet will be detected by the system. This capability will further increase as more and more monitoring stations join the global network of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the organization mandated to establish the verification regime so that it is operational when the treaty enters into force.
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| 2 |
ID:
111932
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
EPTEMBER 1, 1961 marks an "Infamous Anniversary," a turning point in the Cold War. The nuclear powers - at the time only the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom - had refrained from nuclear testing for almost three years while negotiations on a nuclear test ban went on in Geneva. This absence of nuclear testing was based on mora-toria - unilateral, voluntary expressions of restraint.
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