| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is designed to combat a defined insurgency. In the present situation in Iraq, COIN's definition has been radically extended to include nation-building as well. This additional function has expanded the scope of the role of the Coalition Forces in Iraq. Yet COIN in its present incarnation may not be enough to finalize the implementation of the strategy of nation-building. This article finds three main criticisms/limitations of contemporary COIN strategy: (1) It is predicated on a classic notion of insurgency that looks very different from present conflicts. (2) Although COIN advocates a political solution to a political problem, it uses (by default) mainly military mechanisms to carry it out. (3) Completion of the intricate and ambitious tasks necessary to defeat insurgencies in foreign lands may lie outside the direct control of the United States.
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