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| 1 |
ID:
091578
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is situated within the contemporary debates about the nature and purpose of China's growing power. It uses the concepts of "national interest" and "international responsibility" as a framework of analysis for Chinese foreign policy, and develops a three-dimensional typology to conceptualize their relationship (antagonistic; instrumental; mutually constitutive). This article adopts two main arguments. First, a stronger China is one gravitating toward greater notions of international responsibility, albeit instrumentally. Second, observable trends in China's evolving worldview indicate, however, that it is conceiving its national interests more broadly, embracing further socialization and greater normative commitments to international society. One may therefore view China's burgeoning global role as a great power with a degree of "cautious optimism."
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| 2 |
ID:
161564
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China's spectacular economic growth over the past decades has given rise to a more confident and proactive China in global governance. China is now an institution-builder, with new Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank designed to cement Beijing's central role in global economic governance. What, then, are the potential implications of a slowing economy for China's institutional power and global governance role? This article locates China's economic growth and slowdown in broader discussions about China's global position and questions about responsibility, order and governance. It argues that China's economic slowdown will not result in a drastic impact on Beijing's institutional power as there are key material, historical and ideational drivers at play here. Unless China is confronted with the prospect of an economic collapse, it will continue to pursue an active institutional role, speak the rhetoric of South–South solidarity with emerging economies and seek a leadership role in reforming global economic governance, even with a slowing economy, because this is intrinsically tied to its identity and how China now positions itself in an evolving global order.
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| 3 |
ID:
121416
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The early- to mid-1940s leading to the establishment of the United Nations have often been cited by historians and international relations scholars as a critical historical juncture where the concept of Great Power responsibility became institutionalised into the fabric of international society. How such a concept came about, however, and how ideas about their roles and responsibilities were debated and projected by the Great Powers themselves, have been given less prominence in the literature. In particular, China's role in negotiating a post-Second World War order has been largely neglected. This analysis thus explores projections of China's Great Power role as well as examines how China conceptualised, negotiated, and used notions of Great Power responsibility and how this interplayed with wider notions in international society. Despite the operational constraints China faced, there was more Chinese agency and deliberation than is traditionally portrayed, with China bringing some important ideas to the negotiating table.
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| 4 |
ID:
095031
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