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ID:
149478
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| Summary/Abstract |
In some regions of natural resource extraction, embedded local populations receive transfers that compensate them for environmental consequences of extraction; while in others, these populations receive no benefits and endure negative environmental externalities, which can lead to violent protest. This article develops a formal model of the strategic dynamics among a government, a natural resource extraction firm, and a local population in an extractive region to understand the variation in extractive outcomes. The model specifies the conditions under which firms will provide promised transfers to a local population, distributive conflict will occur, and how the government will respond.
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| 2 |
ID:
091614
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do targets sometimes make concessions when third parties offer assistance? Both the extended deterrence and alliance literatures point to unreliable third parties to explain deterrence failure and target acquiescence. On the other hand, the alliance literature also suggests that third parties present a moral-hazard situation in which targets will behave less prudently when they have outside support. Without dismissing the importance of these dynamics, I demonstrate that targets will still make concessions when intervention is certain, and that interveners do not always embolden targets in crisis situations. Counterintuitively, interveners alter the bargaining situation, shifting the bargaining space so that conceding is more attractive than war for the target state. Instead of emboldening targets, third parties deter larger demands and produce settlement outcomes that reduce the burden on the target.
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