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| 1 |
ID:
169276
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper applies a model of the relationship between armed group authority/legitimacy and popular support for armed groups, to explain how the EZLN gained support among a diverse array of constituencies in the period from 1983-2005. Moreover, it shows that the need to maximise support explains the EZLN’s strategy in the different phases of its existence. The EZLN is an interesting case, due to the organization’s high degree of reliance on international and national civil society support, which illustrates the importance of ideology and political messaging in understanding support for armed groups.
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| 2 |
ID:
091617
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using negative binomial models, I analyze the effects of repressive threats and procedural concessions on Zapatista protests from 1994 to 2003. Some of the results appear consistent with previous findings in the literature. Repressive threats had a negative initial effect and a positive delayed effect on protest activity and its simultaneous location across cities. However, procedural concessions had statistically insignificant negative initial and delayed effects on protests and their simultaneous location. Also contrary to the literature, when procedural concessions and repressive threats were combined, they had statistically insignificant positive initial and delayed effects on protest activity and its simultaneous location. Finally, democratization changes decreased Zapatista protests in the short and long term and helped to focus mobilization efforts on the remaining closed environments. Thus, democratization openings and an inconsistent use of repressive threats and procedural concessions did not strengthen the development of the movement; they contributed to the movement's relative weakness.
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