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Modern View
SUICIDE SQUADS
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
091805
Fear factor
/ Hussain, Syed Talat
Hussain, Syed Talat
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2009.
Summary/Abstract
It was the severest hail of bullets I have been under in my career as a soldier. They seemed to come from all directions, intense and unending. It felt like being in the siege of a whole battalion. This is how a colonel described the attack on the General Headquarters (GHQ) on October 10 by a band of 10 terrorist.
Key Words
Security
;
Terrorist
;
Lahore
;
Balochistan
;
Baitullah Mehsud
;
Fear Factor
;
General Headquarter
;
Suicide Squads
;
Pakistan - 1967-1977
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2
ID:
164066
Suicide squads: the logic of linked suicide bombings
/ Warner, Jason; Chapin, Ellen ; Matfess, Hilary
Warner, Jason
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
What strategic logics underlie terrorist groups’ use of linked suicide attacks? Are the goals that groups seek to achieve when sending linked bombing teams somehow inherently different than when sending individual suicide bombers? To answer these questions, this article introduces three typologies of linked suicide bomber detonation profiles—simultaneous, sequential, and nonproximate—and theorizes why terrorist groups might view each type of linked suicide bombing to be preferable to deploying a single suicide bomber. Improvements resulting from using an individual attacker include: ensuring a higher likelihood of successfully hitting a given target (simultaneous detonations); causing more casualties than a single bombing (sequential-wave detonations); and engendering wider-spread shock and awe (nonproximate detonations). Drawing on an original dataset detailing the entirety of Boko Haram’s suicide bombing efforts from 2011 to 2017, we then examine the extent to which these linked bombing typologies do actually appear to successfully lead to an improvement over the deployment of single suicide bombers. While we find that sequential-wave and nonproximate suicide bombings demonstrate evidence of hypothesized improvements over the deployment of single suicide bombers, our data show that deploying simultaneous suicide attackers does not lead to higher efficacy at targeting when compared to the deployment of individual bombers. In attempting to account for this fact, we argue that Boko Haram’s simultaneous detonation teams likely fail to show an improvement over single-bomber attacks because they tend to be composed of what we call “unenthusiastic and under-trained” bombers: teams of often uncommitted women, and sometimes children, which it deploys in tandem in a bid to avoid individual defection and increase the likelihood of at least one detonation in an attack. We conclude by suggesting what the process of linked bombing reveals about both terrorist groups in general and Boko Haram specifically.
Key Words
Suicide Bombings
;
Suicide Squads
;
Boko Haram
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