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| 1 |
ID:
124424
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Indigenous peoples are often perceived as custodians of nature owing to their close relationship with their environment and their nature-based livelihoods. This paper investigates the kinds of environmental agencies that are constructed for, and by, indigenous peoples within the United Nations (UN) Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PF) and the Arctic Council. The particular focus of this research is the issue of responsibility. The article brings together empirical materials from the two forums and engages with them using Foucault-inspired approaches. We offer a critical discussion of indigenous peoples' environmental agency in international politics, addressing the need to problematize representations of indigenous agency that to date have been largely unchallenged in both the practice and study of international politics. We identify three perspectives through which the environmental agency of indigenous peoples is validated and justified: having particular knowledge, being stakeholders, and having a close relationship with nature. Certain kinds of expectations are inscribed in each of these perspectives; responsibility becomes intertwined with agency.
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| 2 |
ID:
121224
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arctic Council is a high-level, mainly intergovernmental forum for
cooperation, coordination, and interaction among Arctic states,1
indigenous
groups, and interested parties of two issue areas, sustainable development in
the Arctic and the protection and study of the fragile Arctic ecosystem. The
council is poorly understood and little advertised. And while it cannot enact
binding legislation (except among the member states) or discuss issues of
military security, these supposed "weaknesses" have actually helped to forge
consensus in other important issue areas.
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| 3 |
ID:
133977
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This Survey covers materials reflecting Chinese practice in 2013 relating to: Fundamental Principles of International Law (The Principle of Equality of State Sovereignty; Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; Prohibition of Threat or Use of Force; Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes; Non-intervention in Internal Affairs); Sources of International Law (Identification of Customary International Law; Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties; Provisional Application of Treaties); Relationship between International Law and Chinese Law (Act on Administration of Tax Collection Revised; Act on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Revised; Act on Seed Revised; Act on Animal Epidemic Prevention Revised; Act on Trade Mark Revised; Act on Fishery Revised; Act on Marine Environment Protection Revised; Act on Customs Revised); Recognition of New States (Palestine; Kosovo); Jurisdiction and Immunity (Scope and Application of Universal Jurisdiction; Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction); China's Territorial Integrity (Taiwan; Tibet; China-India Border; Diaoyu Island and its Affiliated Islands; Nansha Islands); Polar Regions (Arctic Council; Antarctic Treaty); International Law of the Sea (Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in part of the East China Sea; Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS); International Seabed Authority (ISA); International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); Marine Biodiversity beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction; Reorganization of State Ocean Administration); International Air and Space Law (Establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone in East China Sea; Peaceful Use of Outer Space; Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space; International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities); International Cyberspace Law (International Code of Conduct for Information Security; Cyber Crime); Aliens (Regulation on Administration of Exit and Entry); International Human Rights Law (Universal Periodic Review; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Their Reform; Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Action Plan for Fighting Human Trafficking (2013-2020)); International Humanitarian Law (Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts; Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflicts); International Law on Disasters (Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters); International Law on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation (Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; Chemical Weapons Convention; Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW); Amended Protocol II to the CCW; Ottawa Convention; Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM); Protocol V to the CCW (ERW); Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); Lethal Autonomous Robots; Arms Trade Treaty (ATT); Small Arms and Light Weapons; Conference on Disarmament (CD)); International Criminal Law (Crimes against Humanity; International Criminal Court (ICC); ICTY and ICTR; UN Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism; Agreement on the Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Joint Anti-Terrorist Exercises by Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Agreement on the Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Joint Anti-Terrorist Operations within Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Trafficking in Cultural Property; Ratification of the Treaty on Transfer of the Convicted between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; International Criminal Judicial Assistance and Police Cooperation); International Environmental Law (Climate Change; Sustainable Development; Protection of Atmosphere; Action Plan on Air Pollutio
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| 4 |
ID:
165919
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arctic Council is frequently called a unique forum but, as this article argues, clubs are common in international politics and in many respects the Arctic Council is a club. This article explores the questions: Why are the Arctic states acting like a club in Arctic politics, and how do internal hierarchies influence how clubs make decisions? As the article illustrates, clubs are the stage for club diplomacy and, in club diplomacy, hierarchies play an important role. Using the Arctic Council as an illustrative case study, this article argues that clubs have internal hierarchies that inform their decision-making processes and their responses to challenges to their status. When clubs try to deal with subjects that extend beyond the boundaries of the sovereignty of club members and the parameters of club membership, club members may suffer from a lack of status and legitimacy to unilaterally deal with the subject.
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| 5 |
ID:
112757
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the role(s) that the member governments want the Arctic Council to have in Arctic Ocean affairs. The article identifies and examines three determining debates over the role and future of the Arctic Council: The first preceded the Arctic Council's creation in 1996, the second occurred during and as a result of the Ilulissat meeting in 2008, and the third followed the political shift in the United States in 2009.
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| 6 |
ID:
128424
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arctic, always before on the frigid edges of the international imagination, is becoming a hot topic in world affairs, particularly in Asia, because of its virtually untapped resources and increasing strategic importance. In 2012, the amount of cargo transported through the region more than doubled, and in May 2013 the Arctic Council, traditionally membered by Europe's Nordic countries, along with Russia, Canada, and the US, granted observer status to China, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, and Italy, a reminder that climate change is opening the Arctic to wider use and commercial exploitation, especially by Asian interests. Indeed, a Chinese shipping company sent that country's first commercial voyage through the Arctic in September 2013. And Russia is negotiating with Korean shippers about using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for energy shipments. These developments are already bringing the Arctic and Asian security agendas together, and in the process changing Asia's strategic boundaries and planning.
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| 7 |
ID:
144560
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| Summary/Abstract |
How has the role of observers in the Arctic Council evolved and why is there increased interest in participation by states and international institutions? This article examines the influence and interest of observers in international institutions. The Arctic Council is an international institution founded in 1996 to promote Arctic environmental protection and sustainable development. Ultimately, observers are weak actors in the Council. Despite this weakness, actors seek to become observers for two reasons. First, actors seek to contribute to the governance of environmental issues of global importance. Second, actors strive to gain as states develop the economic potential of the Arctic region.
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| 8 |
ID:
091819
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rapidity of Arctic melt is no longer the phantasmagoria of B-grade movies, such as the 'Day after tomorrow', but is occurring at a rate unimaginable just a few years ago. In 2007, more than one million square miles of ice melted, leaving the region with only half the ice that existed in 1950. The Arctic has been propelled into the centre of geopolitics as global climate change has transformed the region into a maelstrom of competing commercial, national security and environmental concerns with profound implications for the international legal and political system. The prospect of longer ice-free periods in the Arctic has momentous implications for the region's commercial development, in itself a further risk to melting Arctic ice. This article argues that Arctic melt does and will continue to pose economic, military and environmental challenges to the governance of the region and explores the role of technological factors as both a barrier and an enabler of access. Working within existing institutions and building capacity is preferable to the proliferation of new institutions, although the full structure and scope of the legal and regulatory frameworks that may be needed are, at present, unclear. But what is clear, is that Arctic melt is on the increase.
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| 9 |
ID:
140895
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May 2013, China gained observer status in the Arctic Council, exemplifying its growing legitimacy as a regional actor in the eyes of the eight countries with territory north of the Arctic Circle. Yet since China remains an extraregional state without territory in the Arctic, Chinese officials continue to bolster their state’s legitimacy as an Arctic stakeholder through two spatially inconsistent but mutually reinforcing grand regional narratives. On the one hand, Chinese officials recognize the salience of territory and presence in the Arctic, underscoring their country’s “near-Arctic” location and polar scientific expeditions. On the other hand, officials depict the Arctic as a maritime, global space where climate change has potential ramifications for the entire planet. Significantly, these reframings are affecting intraregional states’ perceptions of the Arctic, demonstrating how a region’s territorial extent, symbolic meaning, and institutional form emerge through the ongoing conversation between extraregional and intraregional narratives.
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| 10 |
ID:
181704
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arctic has attracted world attention in recent years as global warming began melting the sea ice at a much faster rate than recorded after 1979, the year when record-keeping began for the region. This new-found attention is also linked with greater accessibility of the Arctic Ocean, which is creating a geopolitical competition for resources and control. So far, the world media has focused primarily on the efforts of China in the Arctic due to its economic might, resulting in numerous academic literature. In comparison, the efforts of India in the Arctic have been relatively lesser researched and discussed. Those available have provided conflicting and sometimes debating opinions. It is with this understanding that the article discusses India’s past and present engagement in the Arctic, with possible future trends and recommendations for India’s evolving engagements in this region.
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| 11 |
ID:
127026
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
International cooperation in the Arctic has been expanding steadily since the start of the 21st century, assuming systemic outlines over a relatively short period of time (from 2006 till 2013), as evidenced by a series of development concepts approved by the interested countries for their respective regions. The review of these documents indicates that most of the key tasks lie in the foreign policy field, with Arctic diplomacy playing a major role in their implementation. Unique geographical and climatic features make the Arctic truly international. The Arctic Ocean is a center of gravity for polar and off-polar nations. Dividing lines here are less noticeable than on land, but this does not detract from their legal significance. More often than not, resources within the exclusive economic zones of the five littoral states are transboundary in nature and their development (e.g., Shtokman field, Yamal LNG) requires the creation of international consortiums. Apart from cooperation, the Arctic states also have to coordinate their mutual interests and regulate disputes. All these aspects in their entirety form the thematic area within which Arctic diplomacy is used
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| 12 |
ID:
166013
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article describes the formation and development of South Korea's Arctic strategy. The author concludes that as compared to other Asian observers on the Arctic Council, South Korea has greater potential to develop successful national diplomacy. The country is gradually creating a favorable image and consolidating its political status as a world ecological intermediary implementing a progressive policy of sustainable development.
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| 13 |
ID:
188489
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AFTER nearly three decades of constructive cooperation in the Arctic between Russia and NATO member states, the region is returning to the era of tough confrontation. NATO's leading countries have a growing irrepressible desire to dominate the entire Arctic as increasingly rapid ice melt in the region caused by global climate change makes its seas more navigable and opens new opportunities for tapping its rich natural resources. In pursuit of this goal, NATO countries are ramping up their military activity and offensive potential, creating a major threat to Russian interests in the region, the lion's share of which is under Russian sovereignty, as even Western experts acknowledge.
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| 14 |
ID:
137397
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In 2011, the member states of the Arctic Council signed the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, the first legally binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council. In 2013, an Agreement on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response was signed. The purpose of this article is to explore why the two agreements have been negotiated, examine their substance, and assess their practical impact. Norway is used as an illustrative case. It is argued that both agreements are more important for the Arctic Council than for Norway. Explaining the reality of the agreements can indicate something about the potential for future agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council.
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| 15 |
ID:
159855
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This policy brief focuses on the opening of the Central Arctic Ocean and the subsequent questions this poses to regional governance. This change has the potential to radically alter the nature of Arctic governance as non-Arctic states will have to play a significant role in the rules that will apply in the Arctic high seas. Talks about a regional fisheries regime will define the future of this region. The creation of a coordinating agreement would have the benefit of not challenging Arctic states too fundamentally while at the same time incorporating non-Arctic states in a meaningful way in the regional governance infrastructure.
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| 16 |
ID:
112473
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Environmental state-change in the Arctic Ocean is introducing risks of political, economic and cultural instability. Interests are awakening to take advantage of new energy, shipping, fishing and tourism opportunities associated with the diminishing sea-ice. With urgency-building on the common arctic issues of sustainable development and environmental protection-environmental security offers an holistic context to address the risks and opportunities within law of the sea, as the international legal framework to preserve peace and stability in the Arctic Ocean.
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| 17 |
ID:
126111
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arctic is beginning to test the stage-managed optics of China and Russia's 'strategic partnership'. Friction was most recently on display after the Arctic Council's May 2013 decision to confer permanent observer status on Beijing. The Chinese media celebrated the move as an affirmation of the nation's 'legitimate rights' in Arctic affairs.1 Russian officials were much less enthusiastic. Following the decision, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev quickly reminded China that 'Arctic states lay down the rules here'.2 In fact, Russia was the primary force in obstructing China's observer status application for nearly seven years. It was only after considerable pressure from Nordic nations and a 2011 change, which required new observers to 'recognize Arctic states' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic', that Moscow reluctantly approved the move.3 Interestingly, Russia is ostensibly China's strongest partner in the eight-member Arctic Council. The observer status episode revealed a rare fracture in a relationship which both sides have taken great care to cultivate as trouble-free. Indeed, recent Sino-Russian policy synchronisation on Syria and Iran, among other issues, has led Richard Weitz to assert that bilateral relations between Russia and China are at an all time high.4 However, Arctic climate change presents a challenge for these bilateral relations. Long-suppressed disagreements concerning access to sea lanes, fisheries and energy resources are quickly gaining practical application as sea ice cover diminishes. This article examines Sino-Russian interaction in the Arctic and concludes that, notwithstanding present differences, several factors suggest that cooperation will prevail.
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| 18 |
ID:
161406
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Singapore is expert at using education as a means of projecting soft power internationally. For years, it has offered free and subsidized education opportunities in Southeast Asia, and now, with its interests in the Arctic, it is offering education opportunities to indigenous peoples as a way to involve itself in regional governance.
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| 19 |
ID:
143341
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While a long-term decrease in overall Arctic sea ice extent has been recorded by the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (2014) since the late 1970s, the unprecedented levels of ice melting and thinning experienced in the region in 2007, and subsequently in 2012, have brought the Arctic once again to the forefront of international affairs. Much popular and academic attention has focused on whether the Arctic is likely to remain a zone of cooperation, or descend into conflict. However, less attention has been paid to examining the evolution and role of fora in the region, such as the Arctic Council. In this paper, it is argued that three visions are presently shaping ways of thinking about the Council: the first envisages the Council as a society for Arctic states; the second sees the Council as a steward for the Arctic; and the third imagines the Council as a fully-fledged security actor. The extent to which each vision is manifested in the practices of the Council and its members is also examined. Finally, the paper considers what the ongoing tensions within and among these three ways of conceptualising the Council means for its future prospects, and for Arctic politics more generally.
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