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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
168802
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article puts forward a historical institutionalist explanation of how rising powers translate increased wealth into military strength. It develops microfoundations for path dependence and applies them empirically as an approach to defense procurement. The Indian government layered market reforms onto a state-run defense sector. It aimed to exploit competition in its massive acquisition of combat fighter aircraft after 2007. Yet, despite formal rule changes and overwhelming material benefits, government reformers ultimately failed and returned to an intergovernmental purchase in 2015. I develop two mechanisms to explain this instance of failed institutional change in India. First, the reform's structural misfit created uncertainty, as some of the prerequisites for a market such as sound legal protection and private actors were absent. Second, the government reformers were reluctantly supported at the outset by a coalition of so-called opportunists, which neither fully embraced nor strongly opposed institutional reforms. When problems resulting from the misfit multiplied and promised benefits vanished, however, this coalition dissolved and layering failed. A process-tracing analysis and the triangulation of a diverse set of data substantiate this explanation. The article contributes to debates on institutional change as well as to those on rising powers and the constraints they face in their attempts to transform growing wealth into military strength. Most significantly, it specifies a causal pathway along which state institutions shape the defense policies of rising powers. Layered reforms may fail not only when faced by defenders of the status quo; opportunists may suffice to defeat them.
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| 2 |
ID:
158954
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| Summary/Abstract |
States generate the hardware of military power by either developing new technologies as first mover or adopting demonstrated technology as second mover. Given that military drones have arguably demonstrated effectiveness and thus proliferate, scholars have produced profound insights into today’s second mover dynamics. Yet, the preceding political process of developing this military technology remains poorly understood. The article’s objective is to explain how states become first movers of military hardware. To this end, it applies four causal mechanisms of military innovation studies to the historical trajectory of the development of drones. I argue that security threats initially formed state interests in drones. Yet, capacity was necessary for success. Politically induced transfers and cross-sector diffusion supplied technological progress. At the same time, distributional implications and legacy systems constrained the development process, but could ultimately be overcome. This mechanismic pathway results from the process-tracing analysis of two separate, but related trajectories in Israel and the United States since the 1970s. Given within-case variation, a sequencing and domain-of-application perspective allows the formulation of scope conditions of the mechanisms behind military innovation. This contributes to a historically contingent, yet generalisable, understanding of the political process of how states generate military power.
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| 3 |
ID:
188324
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| Summary/Abstract |
The increasing demand for cybersecurity has been met by a global supply, namely, a rapidly growing market of private companies that offer their services worldwide. Cybersecurity firms develop both defensive (e.g. protection of own networks) and offensive innovations (e.g. development of zero days), whereby they provide operational capacities and expertise to overstrained states. Yet, there is hardly any systematic knowledge of these new cybersecurity warriors to date. Who are they, and how can we differentiate them? This contribution to the special issue seeks to give an initial overview of the coordination between public and private actors in cyberspace. I thus explore these new private security forces by mapping the emerging market for these goods and services. The analysis develops a generic typology from a newly generated data set of almost one hundred companies. As a result of this stock-taking exercise, I suggest how to theorize public-private coordination as network relationships in order to provide a number of preliminary insights into the rise of this ‘brave new industry’ and to point out critical implications for the future of private security forces.
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| 4 |
ID:
091884
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, we argue that the premature abolishment of the allegedly anachronistic concepts of internal versus external security is of doubtful heuristic value for the study of security practices. The two domains may gradually converge from the perspective of problems, but do so much less in terms of political practices. We show that security policy is pursued according to different systems of rules. It follows distinct institutional logics. We undertake a systematic comparison of policy-making in the European Union's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). It is structured along the distinction between making and implementing an agreement as indicative stages of the policy-making process. First, rule-setting asks how decisions are made in the two domains: with or without the inclusion of external actors. Second, we explore whether the implementation of political decisions involves management or enforcement mechanisms. The empirical results are unambiguous: the political actors follow different systems of rules in the two domains. There are still 'ideal-typical' differences in a Weberian sense. This implies that internal and external security may be closely linked, like the opposite sides of the same coin, but must be separated for the purpose of analytical clarity.
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| 5 |
ID:
164623
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| Summary/Abstract |
India has evolved not only as a rising power in Asia, but as the world’s largest arms importer. While facing some international threats, its defense-industrial policy is primarily driven by domestic opportunities and constraints. India’s enormous market size enables technology transfers, whereas domestic factors fundamentally exacerbate their effective utilization. Most significantly, attempts to liberalize the defense industries face the challenge of missing institutional prerequisites and political resistance against reforms. To date, the predominance of state institutions has prevailed. This conclusion is derived from combining data on general trends with the exploration of one recent process of fighter-aircraft acquisition.
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| 6 |
ID:
116242
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains the establishment of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy (esdp) in 1998-99 and its institutional design. I argue that both the soft balancing explanation and the "second wave" of approaches fall short. In contrast, the article shows that liberal-institutionalist thought and transaction costs economics offer a heuristically promising perspective. Most crucially, the pivotal concept of asset specificity provides explanatory leverage. The combination of risks of opportunism and the non-specificity of esdp's ultimate assets explains why and how the major European powers designed the eu's security and defense pillar in 1998-99. Empirically, I trace how the United Kingdom and France were gradually confronted with not fully credible commitments within nato for crisis management in Europe. Based primarily on the signals sent by us domestic politics, they were increasingly concerned about isolationism and questioned the American commitment to European security. Therefore, they were searching for another institutional option for providing security on a long-term basis. Although this assessment of ex post transaction costs triggered the initial establishment of esdp, ex ante transaction costs were responsible for its more specific design. Given the indirect American threat of disengagement when faced with Europe's aspirations for autonomy, esdp had to be designed in a compatible way with nato. Non-specific, and thus redeployable, military assets represented the institutional solution to the conflict between European autonomy and NATO's primacy. In other words, asset specificity as the key analytical concept of transaction costs economics is what differentiates this argument from previous accounts and provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding both the establishment and design of esdp in 1998-99.
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