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ID:
091230
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At this juncture ongoing military operations and growing demand for domestic counterterrorism information will likely necessitate continuing reliance on private sector augmentation into the foreseeable future. Given this assumption, the time has arrived for the government to move beyond viewing its commercial augmentation as an ad hoc resource without having clear strategies and policy for its use.
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| 2 |
ID:
091232
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The legal Devil's Advocate is clearly a role-player. yet his ability to assume characteristics identified with authentic dissenters makes that dissent more productive. The legal culture's acceptance of dissent increases the opportunities for actual dissenters to influence it, and facilitates the activities of its role-players. Lawyers also have a range of techniques available for use on their clients behalf.
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| 3 |
ID:
091231
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fundamental problem with evaluating intelligence products is that intelligence, for the most part, is probabilistic. Even when an intelligence analyst presumes to know a fact, it is still subject to interpretation, or may have been the result of a deliberate campaign of deception.
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| 4 |
ID:
091229
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Americans have always been ambivalent about internal security and homland defense. In times of crisis, they are willing to give up some measure of privacy and accept the erosion of normal liberties in the interest of collective security.
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| 5 |
ID:
091237
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A legal framework for intelligence delineates the rights, obligations, and powers of the intelligence organisations, as well as the arrangements for their governance and accountability, provides the intelligence system with guidance as to what it can and cannto do, indicates who is in charge and who oversees the activity of intelligence; insures that the intelligence apparatus is responsible before the law in case of abuses; makes sure that the IC benefits from legal protection if it observes the legally agreed guidance and directions.
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| 6 |
ID:
091235
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over tha last five years, cases of ethnic Chinese and Aemricans charged and/or convicted for having transmitted, or conspired to transmit, sensitive technologies, proprietary information, or government information to the People's Republic of China (China) have made headlines on a regular basis in the United States. This is no coincidence. PRC intelligence activities against the U.S. are judged by government officials and experts to be very aggressive, and at a level matching that the Cold War.
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| 7 |
ID:
091239
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Congressional monitoring of intelligence activities has always been somewhat controversial, but its roots go back to the founding era of the United States, when the new Constitution gave both the President and Congress important roles in foreign affairs.
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