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| 1 |
ID:
091407
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 and Russia's ensuing recognition of South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence have generated a new context in relations between the EU, the US and Russia. The crisis created new sources of instability in the entire post-Soviet space, highlighting a new form of Russian revisionism and revealing the limitations of Western policies in what the Kremlin views as its sphere of influence. Caucasian-Central Asian states now wonder whether it is worth complicating their relations with Moscow for the sake of limited or uncertain support from the West. Even if the long-term repercussions of the Russian-Georgian crisis remains unpredictable, one thing is clear: the EU and the US should engage with the region more intensively. In the long run, only economic development in the region, genuine democratisation and real prospects of becoming anchored in Euro-Atlantic structures, alongside effective confidence-building measures between the parties, will be able to induce the secessionist regions to rethink their future.
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| 2 |
ID:
091410
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The European Council's 2008 'Immigration Pact' has been touted by its main protagonist, the French government, as a turning point in EU migration policymaking. In one respect at least, the French are not exaggerating. The Pact represents a challenge to a key assumption underpinning European integration, namely that communitarised policymaking procedures are the best means of achieving truly common policies: Paris presented the intergovernmental Pact as a means of succeeding where communitarised decision-making has failed - in achieving the goal of a coherent common migration policy. However, analysis shows the French claims to be largely unfounded: although the European Council might theoretically have played a useful role here, in practice its efforts will add little to the achievement of a truly common policy.
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| 3 |
ID:
091408
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The EU's agenda in promoting multilateralism faces a few challenges in the eastward direction. The Caspian Sea basin, which has been acquiring increasing importance for the EU in the context of energy, above all gas, supplies from the Caucasus and Central Asia, represents a complex mix of states with different histories, identities, regimes, centres of gravity and regional ambitions. Unlike the Black Sea basin, where the EU has developed the Black Sea Synergy policy, none of the Caspian littoral states is an EU member and this has led to a lack of EU interest in and commitment to the promotion of multilateralism in the area. Thus, in spite of significant energy security interests, the EU lacks the will, the capacity or the consistency to address regional security issues or promote reform. Indeed, economic interests are inevitably likely to clash with the reform promotion objective.
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| 4 |
ID:
091411
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since it came back into power in May 2008, the Berlusconi government has undertaken a number of important initiatives in foreign policy, especially in relation to the European Union. Three cases concern the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the war in Georgia and the climate change/energy package. Rather than following a pro- or anti-Europe line, it is argued that the link between all these initiatives is the development of a pragmatic foreign policy, in which the ultimate aim is to promote Italy's economic interests. This means that in some cases the Berlusconi government is supportive of the European integration process, especially when no specific Italian interest is at stake, whereas it does not hesitate to undermine it should it clash with Italy's economic interests.
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| 5 |
ID:
091409
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, there has been a lively debate on "the end of the West" with the rise of authoritarian capitalist powers and the challenge they pose to the values and institutions of the West. The debate has to be qualified in two important respects. First, China and Russia have - albeit for different reasons - major stakes in the preservation of the current world order, thus making it unlikely that they will be able or willing to launch a sustained assault on it. Second, and perhaps more importantly, despite certain current similarities in their international outlook, China and Russia are in fact far from natural and permanent partners in the creation of a new anti-liberal world order. Therefore, instead of galvanising a strong resistance against the rise of China and, to a lesser extent, Russia, the future challenge for the West is to find ways to deal constructively with these countries so as to reinforce the liberal and multilateral elements of the present world order. This will necessarily require a moderate and constructive stance from China and Russia, one that can plausibly be expected in the natural course of events, provided they are given a chance to voice their legitimate concerns.
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