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| 1 |
ID:
089640
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Regular elections have become a common feature in Moroccan politics. While elections were "contested" as an instrument of control until the mid-1990s, starting with the 1997 parliamentary elections - and followed by those in 2002 and 2007 - Morocco established an electoral system as the keystone of royal power based on limited political participation. At the same time, since 1997 the Moroccan political system has witnessed the arrival of a "newcomer," the Islamist Hizb al-'Adl wa al-Tanmiyya (Justice and Development Party), which the Kingdom integrated into the electoral process. Based on Joseph Schumpeter's intrinsic-value theory of electoral politics, this article will analyze this unique electoral process and the potential that it holds for Morocco's democratization. Evidence from public opinion research is used to argue that the electorate's de-politicization has engendered a shaky alliance in favor of electoral politics. The consequence of this is a contradiction that may be typical of elections in authoritarian states. On one hand, the indirect values of elections are a push towards greater debate about the meaning of democracy. On the other, the electoral process also results in the reproduction of patron-client relations, which undermine any indirect, abstract values that are produced in the very same process. This, in turn, can be considered an inherent weakness of the process for political parties that aim at establishing a democratic force for change.
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| 2 |
ID:
089642
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the discovery of large quantities of natural gas, the Qatari economy has experienced sustained economic growth. Similar to what has occurred in other Gulf states, a consequence of this economic boom is that the demand level for skilled and unskilled labor far outstrips that which Qatari nationals can provide. As a result, Qatar has imported foreign labor to the point where foreigners outnumber Qataris by almost seven to one. Moreover, the structure of the labor market - in particular, the system of generous and near-guaranteed public sector employment - diminishes incentives for Qataris to acquire valuable skills and to work in the private sector. The reliance on foreign laborers and the lack of skilled Qatari workers is widely seen by Qatar's leaders as a serious threat to the nation's economic autonomy and long-term economic viability. Thus a key challenge facing policymakers is to devise policies and reforms that will help develop a domestic workforce with the skills and incentives to work in the economy's most important and competitive positions. Drawing on public data sources, this article provides a detailed quantitative assessment of the economic and demographic situation that underlies the current challenges and discusses several policy options that might be used to help overcome them.
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| 3 |
ID:
089644
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the development of Qatar's unique relationship with Israel, and explains the relationship as just one component of the Emirate's intricate and bold foreign policy. This discussion identifies both the logic behind Qatar's regional policy initiatives as well as the Emirate's ability to adapt to changing regional and international circumstances. As such, this article provides an example of how a small, wealthy state like Qatar can skillfully generate a sophisticated, independent foreign policy agenda that differentiates itself from its larger and influential neighbors, while simultaneously upgrading its international profile and gaining regional prominence.
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| 4 |
ID:
089641
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Qatar's much publicized liberalization campaign that began in the mid-1990s was a direct result of efforts by the new Amir, Shaykh Hamad, to compensate for his fragile base of support within the ruling Al Thani family by appealing to a broader base of Qataris and also to the international community. Historically, the Al Thani family had been one of the only centers of potential opposition to the reigning Amir, with merchant families or the religious establishment having been politically neutralized due to a variety of historical and structural reasons. Nevertheless, in relation to both groups the state has pursued a nuanced policy of simultaneous co-option and political incapacitation. Meanwhile, steady rises in oil and gas revenues allowed the state to significantly deepen its capacity in relation to society, and, by doing so, to ensure that groups from within civil society did not rise to positions of prominence. Within the Al Thanis, Shaykh Hamad undertook a number of significant changes, not the least of which was the creation of new institutions and offices that were staffed by his loyal supporters, including some of his sons and daughters. He also streamlined the line of succession to include only his own descendants. With the traditional political disquiet of the Al Thanis thus silenced, at least for now, all talks of liberalization have been dropped and the Qatari state remains fundamentally autocratic.
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| 5 |
ID:
089638
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
To what extent do gender considerations impact voter recruitment strategies in Middle Eastern elections? Based on an examination of voting behavior in Egypt, we find that clientelist voter recruitment tends to empower women economically rather than politically as elections provide an opportunity for disadvantaged women to sell their vote to local vote brokers or offer their vote to a local patron in exchange for a future payoff. In contrast, women who vote for Islamist candidates may be able to increase the influence of their political support by creating common knowledge about the popularity of their candidate and by reducing the effectiveness of government repression.
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