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| 1 |
ID:
087370
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the second half of the 2000s, several
unprecedented developments in the
Arab-Israeli confl ict have highlighted
the potential of a dramatic alteration
of the Middle East's strategic landscape.
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has sponsored
a world conference on dialogue
among various faiths and cultures, including
Islam, Christianity and Judaism. It
opened with a meeting in Madrid, Spain,
in July 2008, and a follow-up session
was held under the auspices of the United
Nations in New York City the following
November. The list of participants in this
latest meeting included the kings of Saudi
Arabia and Jordan; the emirs of Kuwait
and Bahrain; the presidents of Israel, the
United States, Finland, Pakistan and Lebanon;
and the prime ministers of Britain,
Qatar, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates,
Djibouti and Egypt.
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| 2 |
ID:
087372
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
aspect of the
Palestinian experience has been easy or
well communicated to the global public,
but it does seem that post-9/11 Western
discourse on Arabs and Muslims has led to
particularly biased reporting of the confl ict,
a glib assumption by major networks that
their American viewers see the world just
as Benjamin Netanyahu or Michael Oren
do. Comprehensive reportage was really
impossible; the Israelis barred journalists
from Gaza, and the wildest sorts of allegations
are being made. Still, we have an
idea of the human impact: more than 1,300
Palestinians have been killed and more
than 5,300 wounded, compared to thirteen
Israeli deaths (some by friendly fi re), as of
January 18, 2008. The "why" of this latest
adventure is harder to fathom, unless Israel
truly desires to remain in a state of confl
ict, and for that confl ict to worsen. This
ought to be given serious consideration; it
is not for nothing that Israel has become
an exporter of weapons, security systems
and "security training." Moreover, most
Israelis remain physically segregated from
Palestinian suffering and many maintain
a comfortable and secure lifestyle that
may not be much of an incentive to peace.
Others live far less comfortably, travel by
public transport but lack any sympathy for
Palestinians, not only due to their separation
from or ignorance of them, but due to
fear, enlarged by the media.
Declarations like "Hamas has to be
taught a lesson" belie the fact that Hamas
is a movement located throughout the
Palestinian national body, just as Hizbollah
represents large numbers of Shii Muslims
in Lebanon, and as an accepted political
party, cannot be easily extricated from the
nation. Most curious are Tzipi Livni's declarations
of "success," which were implicitly,
if subtly, challenged by Fareed Zakaria
and others who have questioned the real
military intent of reconquering Gaza. If by
"successful" Livni means that there will be
an end to Hamas, she is wrong. To claim
that the goal is to reduce the numbers of
rockets (which have killed very few Israelis)
fi red into southern Israel from Gaza
since long before Hamas actually assumed
political control of that area, is also clearly
nonsense. That is not the goal of a mas-
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| 3 |
ID:
087377
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Democracy in the Middle East
has been in the spotlight of the
world media for a number of
years now. Along with the evergrowing
international debate on the importance
of democratizing political systems
around the globe, questions such as how
seriously the Arab countries take the calls
to adopt real democratic practices and how
far they have gone in implementing political
reforms continue to arise. While some
signs of change have apparently emerged,
these questions remain diffi cult to answer,
even for practitioners in the fi eld.
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| 4 |
ID:
087374
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
political constituency represented in all
Israeli coalition governments. Successive
Israeli governments have provided fi nancial
means and protection to the settlers
with near total disregard for the profound
impact on Israeli-Palestinian relations. As
a result, any Israeli peace overture under
these circumstances has been viewed by
the Arab states as an empty slogan and a
cynical attempt to sway public opinion.
Contrary to the facts on the ground, as the
occupation becomes less and less tenable,
Israeli governments continue to justify it
as indispensable to national security in an
effort to justify further entrenchment.
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| 5 |
ID:
087375
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
the headline-grabbing foreignpolicy
initiative of Obama's
election campaign was that his
administration would talk to Tehran
"without preconditions." The idea that
American diplomacy in the Middle East
needs renewal is evident, and the Obama
presidency has brought with it hopes that
a new diplomatic initiative might aid the
most intractable foreign-policy issues in
the region. Perhaps Obama's charisma,
international appeal and emphasis on
engagement will provide America with
a new and productive diplomatic infl uence
that it has so clearly lacked of late.
However, the Obama strategy has been to
pursue "tough direct diplomacy," emphasizing
the potential sticks of economic
pressure and political isolation.1
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| 6 |
ID:
087376
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a global trend toward democratization,
the Middle East has for many
years proved to be the exception.
Nevertheless, very recently this region
has started to come out of its stubborn
resistance to democratic change, resulting
in the ascendancy of political Islam. In the
dominant authoritarian order, religion tends
to provide the Islamist parties a sort of
protection from the repression of political
regimes. This structural advantage has put
the Islamists in a better position to capitalize
on the recent changes in the region, giving
them the opportunity to emerge as winners
in many recent free elections throughout
the region. This is hardly surprising, since
a heavy legacy of authoritarianism, a lack
of democracy, and the oppression of secular
political forces would surely make this
outcome almost inevitable for any election in
this region. Thus, after the 1992 experience
in Algeria, where authorities canceled a general
election dominated by radical Islamists
and precipitated a bloody civil war, several
Islamist parties have managed to come to
power in the Middle East. This has been the
case in Turkey since 2002, Iraq since 2005
and in the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian
election of 2006. An Islamist party coming
to power in democratic elections is a new
phenomenon that is likely to be replicated.
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