| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
091438
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Al Qaeda has crafted a successful media strategy that is adeptly suited for the war of ideas against the United States. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have demonstrated a great ability to lead plural groups and exploit innovation with the use of technology. This article explores how they have connected with diverse audiences around the world with a constant message. The repetition of their platform themes and use of "message projection opportunities" demonstrate a great understanding of human nature, marketing strategy, global media, and world politics. In line with Prospect Theory, bin Laden and Zawahiri's messaging strategy emphasizes stemming losses over solidifying gains. Only through a better understanding of Al Qaeda's media strategy and all of its strengths, weaknesses, and idiosyncrasies can the United States truly recognize what it is up against and begin to construct an effective and comprehensive counter strategy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
091440
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Why do counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states grow more alike amid propensities for divergence? This article engages with this question. It focuses on the counterterrorism measures of Kyrgyzstan and attributes their growing intensity to influence of the neighboring states and regional organizations. It is the contention of this research that Kyrgyzstan's increasingly vigorous responses aimed at combating terrorism are a part of a broader process of convergence of counterterrorism policies and measures targeting religious extremism adopted by Kyrgyzstan's neighbors. The three mechanisms that lie at the roots of this process are direct coercive transfer, harmonization of security policies, and emulation of counterterrorism responses.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
091441
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is designed to combat a defined insurgency. In the present situation in Iraq, COIN's definition has been radically extended to include nation-building as well. This additional function has expanded the scope of the role of the Coalition Forces in Iraq. Yet COIN in its present incarnation may not be enough to finalize the implementation of the strategy of nation-building. This article finds three main criticisms/limitations of contemporary COIN strategy: (1) It is predicated on a classic notion of insurgency that looks very different from present conflicts. (2) Although COIN advocates a political solution to a political problem, it uses (by default) mainly military mechanisms to carry it out. (3) Completion of the intricate and ambitious tasks necessary to defeat insurgencies in foreign lands may lie outside the direct control of the United States.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
091439
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Al Qaeda and its affiliates (AQA) are a loose conglomeration of groups and individuals linked by adherence to a form of Sunni Islam that they call Salafi jihadism. The written works of an intellectually vigorous group of thinkers within AQA show that strategic thought grounded in mainstream global thought on revolutionary warfare exists within this community. A major concern of the strategic thinkers is the extent to which the foot soldiers ignore their prescriptions, engaging in disjointed, counterproductive operations. The U.S. Department of Defense is examining methods by which it might broaden scholarly access to an extensive collection of captured terrorist documents. Such an action would provide fertile grounds for studying this issue.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|