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| 1 |
ID:
113216
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible "lessons learned," but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.
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| 2 |
ID:
101336
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This report sheds new light on the CIA and US Special Forces' covert campaign alongside Afghan Northern Alliance leader General Dostum's horse-mounted Uzbeks during 2001's Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003 and 2005 the author traveled over the Hindu Kush Mountains to the plains of Northern Afghanistan and lived with the legendary Northern Alliance opposition leader General Dostum. His aim was to recreate Dostum's campaign alongside the CIA and Special Forces to seize the holy city of Mazar i Sharif from the Taliban in November 2001. Based on interviews with Dostum and his Uzbek commanders, this article recreates this proxy offensive that saw the Northern Alliance opposition break out of the mountains, seize this shrine town and bring the Taliban house of cards falling down in a matter of weeks. Up until now the indigenous Afghan Uzbeks, who played a crucial role as a 'boots on the ground' fighting force for Centcom, have been cast as a mere backdrop for American heroics. Now their side of the story and their links to the mysterious shrine of Mazar i Sharif are for the first time revealed.
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| 3 |
ID:
118099
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| 4 |
ID:
118888
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| 5 |
ID:
091990
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2002, facing a fast-rising tide of Afghan opium, the Bush Administration's response seemed puzzling. Apparently, the CIA was well aware their Northern Alliance partners had financed themselves by selling opium and herion. The labs and store houses of Afghanistan would have been sensible bombing targets if Afghanistan were to be made anew.
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| 6 |
ID:
139696
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| 7 |
ID:
189801
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE fall of Mohammad Najibullah's regime in April 1992 led to the capture of Kabul by Afghan Mujahideen units, which subsequently faced a number of problems. The new authorities inherited state symbols (namely the capital), but state mechanisms were not functioning - the political elite had left the country, the army was divided along ethnic and religious lines, and the state had no institutions capable of generating income and managing economic resources.
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| 8 |
ID:
098865
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Afghanistan is often depicted as a failing state, but its failures display distinctive patterns over time and space. Regional variations in governance have been important in shaping the ways the Afghan state has failed and the consequences of these failures. This article argues that a history of better governance in the north facilitated the disarmament of militia warlords and comparative stability. By contrast, the south has a long history of minimal formal governance, creating opportunities for increased Taliban insurgency.
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| 9 |
ID:
146760
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| 10 |
ID:
114462
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
LAST SPRING, U.S. President Barack Obama definitively decided to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan. According to his plan, out of the 102,000 servicemen currently stationed in Afghanistan, only 20,000-30,000 will remain in the country by late 2014 in order to carry out support and supply functions.1 Over 40,000 servicemen from Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and other U.S. allies will, most likely, be withdrawn entirely. Between 2010 and the first half of 2011, there were almost 150,000 soldiers from over 40 states in Afghanistan, yet this number did not suffice for victory. According to a study by the British Parliament, the Afghan central government and the troops of the international coalition control only a third of the country.2
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| 11 |
ID:
110317
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE WEST'S military engagement in Afghanistan is entering its eleventh year and has another two years to go before the end of combat operations in 2014. Whatever the result of the international conferences that began last year in Istanbul and Bonn to elicit support for a successor state, one thing is clear: after Western forces draw down, Afghanistan won't bear much resemblance to the Western vision that fueled the intervention in the first place.However effective Western military organizations are in transitioning to Afghan control, the country's future will not be decided primarily by the residual structures and legacies of Western involvement, the current Taliban insurgency or even any formal process of reconciliation. Rather, it will be decided more by the country's ethnic character, the particular nature of local and national governance, and the influence of neighboring powers with enduring geopolitical and strategic imperatives in the region far stronger than those of the West.
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