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| 1 |
ID:
105328
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Writing this profile after Yasser Arafat's death in 2004, the author argues that Arafat's career was a monument to Western weakness and ineptitude in dealing with international terrorists.
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| 2 |
ID:
128904
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| 3 |
ID:
118379
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The violence wrought by Israel's Arabs on their Jewish compatriots in October 2000 was not an act of social protest as wrongly claimed by the Orr commission, but rather an internal uprising in support of an external attack. Just as the leader of the Palestinian Arabs during the mandate era, Hajj Amin Husseini, dragged his reluctant constituents into a disastrous conflict that culminated in their collective undoing, and Yasser Arafat used the Oslo accords to implicate his equally grudging subjects in the worst military confrontation with Israel since the 1948 war, rather than create the independent Palestinian state envisaged by the accords, so Israel's Arab leaders radicalized their community for decades. The more prosperous, affluent, and better educated the Israeli Arabs have become, the greater has grown their leadership's incitement against their state of citizenship, to the point where many ordinary Arabs have come to openly challenge the fundamental principles underpinning its very existence.
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| 4 |
ID:
183989
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On 21 March 1968, nine months after the Six-Day War, the IDF launched a military operation against the Jordanian town of Karameh, which served as the headquarters of the Fatah terrorist organisation and a springboard for attacks against Israel. Yet rather than deal Fatah a crushing blow, the operation boosted its strength and prestige. Coming in the wake of the astounding June 1967 victory, the Karameh battle underscored the operational difficulties awaiting the IDF in its prolonged low-intensity warfare against non-state terror organisations.
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| 5 |
ID:
190050
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Contrary to the commonly held misconception, Palestinian antisemitism is not a corollary of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but the other way around: the perpetuation of the conflict is a direct result of the deeply ingrained Palestinian-Arab Jew-hatred and the attendant rejection of any form of Jewish statehood. From the onset of the conflict, a century ago to this day, Palestinian Arabs have been subjected to a sustained hate campaign of racial, religious and political incitement that has portrayed Jews (and Israelis) as the source of all evil, synonyms for iniquity, corruption and decadence, whose clear and present danger to human kind can only be removed through their complete annihilation. Small wonder that not a single Palestinian-Arab leader has ever recognised the millenarian Jewish attachment to the Land of Israel or evinced a true liking for the ‘two-state solution’ since it was first evoked in 1937.
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| 6 |
ID:
171695
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Despite the growing number of studies analysing the role of media in peace processes, there is almost no literature on the relationship between media and public opinion during peace processes. This article examines this question using the case study of the Oslo Accords. Specifically, it analyzes the compatibility between media portrayals of Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli and Palestinian public support for peace negotiations. The findings indicate that (a) the enemy’s binary image may change positively following the signing of peace agreements; and (b) this change may accelerate emerging peace processes.
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| 7 |
ID:
192895
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Thirty years after its euphoric launch, the ‘Oslo peace process’ between Israel and the PLO stands as the worst calamity to have afflicted Israelis and Palestinians since the 1948 war, and the most catastrophic strategic blunder in Israel’s history. By replacing Israel’s control of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians with corrupt and repressive terrorist entities that indoctrinated their subjects with burning hatred of Jews and Israelis, as well as murdered some 2,000 Israelis and rained thousands of rockets and missiles on their population centres, the Oslo process has made the prospects for peace and reconciliation ever more remote. By deflating the combative ethos of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), it has weakened Israel’s national security and made the outbreak of a multi-front war a distinct possibility. By transforming the PLO (and, to a lesser extent, Hamas) into internationally accepted political actors without forcing them to shed their genocidal commitment to the Jewish state’s destruction, it weakened Israel’s international standing. And by deepening Israel’s internal cleavages and destabilising its sociopolitical system, it has created a clear and present danger to the Jewish State’s thriving democracy, indeed to its very existence.
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| 8 |
ID:
161382
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This article records an interview with Joel Singer, one of the authors of the Oslo Accords who was brought into the process from Washington DC at a later stage of the negotiations. The Oslo channel was established by Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, Norwegian academic Terje Rød-Larsen and Israeli academic Yoel Hirschfeld, who understood Yasser Arafat’s need to initiate a new path for relationships with Israel. At that time, negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were illegal. The PLO was considered a terrorist organisation and the Israeli government refused to officially negotiate with Arafat, though it was clear that he was still the person most able to strike a deal, and the only true representative of the Palestinian people. Bilateral negotiations begun in Washington between Israelis and Palestinians who were supposedly independent of the PLO led to nowhere. This is Singer’s version of this peace chapter. The article assesses the positive and negative aspects, lessons and implications of the process and of the Oslo Accords.
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| 9 |
ID:
091996
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article examines the key development in Palestinian politics in the post-Arafat era, including the decision of Hamas to participate in the democractic political process. Even though the issue of succession was settled with much more ease then expected, the divisions within the Palestinian movement came to the fore with the electoral victory of Hamas in the January 2006 legislative elections.The subsequent power struggle between fatah and Hamas completely fragmented the palestinian community.
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| 10 |
ID:
108521
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| 11 |
ID:
180053
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This interview with Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Annika Söder (2014–19) discusses her involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and Sweden’s relationships with Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The interview assesses the positive and negative lessons and implications of the peace process, Sweden’s involvement in the peace process, and the likelihood of bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a close.
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| 12 |
ID:
103011
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| 13 |
ID:
128174
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Oslo Accords' dashed hopes, the Rabin assassination, the second intifada, and the policy of separation and military reality in the Occupied Palestinian Territories have defined younger Israelis' outlook.
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