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1 |
ID:
171964
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Summary/Abstract |
The hacker is the epitome of a cybersecurity threat and the embodied misuse of the Internet. However, in recent years, notions of hacking have begun to change. Blurred boundaries mark the term, best expressed in its overlap with “security researcher.” This article draws on a 3.5-year research project on the hacker community and applies an international political sociology framework to uncover routines of rationalization. Interviews with IT and cybersecurity industry experts expose accepted identities, practices, and behaviors of hackers, which allows for the construction of in-group and out-group members in the IT and cybersecurity field. Additionally, the empirical findings are used to propose a conceptual framework (the Möbius strip) to situate the moral valence of hackers on a flexible model. Thus, the article provides insight into the ontological and normative complexities that define the study of hackers, as well as the perception of IT and cybersecurity professionals.
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2 |
ID:
181940
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Summary/Abstract |
The stability in the cyber domain is rapidly deteriorating on several fronts marked by increasing sophistication of cyberattacks, declining consensus on global internet governance and intensifying great power competition. These challenges were critical turning points among nation-states to recalibrate prevailing cyber diplomatic engagements. This article investigates the increasing prominence of deterrence in the practice of cyber diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. Using Japan and Australia as case studies, it argues that both states continue to adhere to the conceptual tenets of cyber diplomacy, however, in practice, there is a growing integration of deterrence—cyber capabilities and public attribution/naming and shaming—in the equation at varying degrees and intensities. The article endeavours to make two important contributions: First, revitalize the existing cyber diplomacy framework by challenging the extant literature’s view of deterrence’s limited application—underpinned by cold war analogies—and the implausibility of conducting attribution of cyberattacks. Secondly, evaluate Japan and Australia’s cyber diplomacy based on empirical evidence. Key findings suggest that deterrence reinforces/complements the fundamental elements present in the cyber diplomacy playbook. While slight variation exists, there is a strong acquiescence between Japan and Australia to expand existing cyber cooperation to tackle critical and emerging technologies, supply chain, and data governance.
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3 |
ID:
186761
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4 |
ID:
126187
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Publication |
2012-13.
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Summary/Abstract |
Outline cybersecurity measures to combat the internet's dark side
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5 |
ID:
171965
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Summary/Abstract |
This is an article about how cybersecurity gets “made,” with a focus on the role of commercial computer security firms in generating knowledge in matters of international cybersecurity. The argument is two-fold. Firstly, malware may be an intangible artefact in some ways, but its success and its interpretation as malware is deeply interwoven in social, technical, and material alliances. Secondly, a materialist-minded examination of Symantec’s Stuxnet reports will demonstrate the politically situated nature of how cybersecurity expertise emerges. The article finds that Symantec’s work was not a-political or neutrally-technical: Their experts made profoundly political choices in their analyses. By showing the processes that go into making cybersecurity, the article contributes to a widening and deepening of debates about what is at stake in cybersecurity knowledge and practices.
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6 |
ID:
177817
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper is an assessment of cybersecurity principles within the nuclear arsenal of the United States, specifically the nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile forces. Ongoing modernizations will introduce new components, and potentially new vulnerabilities, into U.S. nuclear forces. The principles for achieving secure operations from the fields of computer security, dependable computing, and systems analysis, and the extent to which they are addressed within the management of U.S. nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles is discussed. This paper then considers the types of vulnerabilities that may be overlooked during modernizations, followed by a critique of U.S. nuclear command and control policy choices that could make the consequences of these vulnerabilities more catastrophic.
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7 |
ID:
139305
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Summary/Abstract |
On 21 January 2015, Internet users in China who were trying to access blocked websites and smartphone apps encountered difficulties connecting to virtual private networks (VPNs), a popular circumvention tool for bypassing censorship in a country where government control of online space has been notorious. Astrill, StrongVPN and Golden Frog, three major providers of commercialVPN services that reported service disruptions, all blamed the interference on the Chinese cyberspace authorities. The attack, they claimed, was carried out with a level of sophistication unseen before. (1
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8 |
ID:
179376
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Summary/Abstract |
The European Union (EU) is becoming increasingly dependent on cyberspace, exposing itself to new security risks. While the EU should seek to limit the proliferation of cyber weapons, the prospect of creating a cyber non-proliferation regime on the blueprint of previous arms control treaties presents several difficulties. By contrast, unilateral cyber ‘disarmament’ through government vulnerability disclosure processes would limit the proliferation of dangerous cyber weapons more effectively and increase deterrence. Few EU member states have taken active steps to establish such processes and little information is available about how they handle the knowledge of vulnerabilities in their possession.
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9 |
ID:
185168
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Summary/Abstract |
The strategic significance accorded to submarine cables has never been a static concept, but it has been homogenous: a focus on protecting cables from external threats. This article argues that because submarine cables have long had strategic value, they provide a means to examine the emerging concept of strategic technology competition between the United States and China. To do so, this article examines major changes to the submarine cable sector since 2015, including the success of Chinese company Huawei Marine, and US and other western government interventions in several cable projects. It characterises the strategic considerations exhibited by submarine cable activity in that period – influence building in third countries, a changing perception among the US and its partners of threat and protection priorities, and closer attention to cable security and surveillance considerations – and compares them with the traditional strategic values attached to submarine cables. It concludes strategic concerns about undersea cables includes a new concept: the construction and installation of cables as a strategic threat, and which adds complexity to a sector in which it is difficult to project influence. This article seeks to make a contribution to scholarship on strategic competition in emerging technologies.
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10 |
ID:
108632
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
China and Russia surprised the international community last month when they submitted a letter at the UN General Assembly outlining a proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security.
The Sept. 12 proposal, which was supported by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, came less than two months before the first major international conference on establishing international norms in cyberspace is set to take place in London.
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11 |
ID:
179228
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Summary/Abstract |
The situation in cyberspace is now taking a very tense turn, due to the rivalry between the world largest economies for leadership in the digital environment. This paper analyzes the role and importance of China's strategy in the information environment and demonstrates the growing impact China has on the decision-making process in the digital environment in the international arena with regard to different technical issues and managing principles. We examine China's defense policy in this area, as well as the country's gradual transformation into one of the world's cyber superpowers capable of challenging American dominance on the Internet, which has already led to sharp confrontation and rivalry between China and the United States in today's information environment; to technological wars; to the development of arsenals of military viruses on both sides; and to the development of information war strategies and tactics.
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12 |
ID:
113386
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13 |
ID:
171962
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Summary/Abstract |
Public attributions of cyber incidents by governments and private industry have become prevalent in recent years. This article argues that they display a skewed version of cyber conflict for several operational and structural reasons, including political, commercial, and legal constraints. In addition, public attribution of cyber incidents takes place in a heavily contested information environment, creating fractured narratives of a shared past. The article uses three cyber incidents (Sony Pictures, DNC, and NotPetya) to show how actors cope with this contested information environment and proposes a changed role of academia to address some of the problems that emerge. To become competent in contesting public attribution discourses, universities would have to work more across physical, disciplinary, and academic boundaries. The main implications for democracies are to be more transparent about how attribution is performed, enable other civilian actors to study cyber conflict, and thereby broaden the discourse on cybersecurity politics.
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14 |
ID:
130849
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15 |
ID:
174873
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Summary/Abstract |
It is hard to disagree with most international relations experts that nuclear arms control is currently undergoing a systemic crisis. Opinions differ on its depth and possible ways out of it. At the same time, many experts consider it necessary to conceptualize the factor of the latest information and communications technologies (ICTs), including artificial intelligence (AI) systems, in the domain of strategic stability. The matter concerns not only the digitalization of nuclear communications, command, control, and intelligence systems (C3I), but also the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS).
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16 |
ID:
158641
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Summary/Abstract |
How does digitalisation lead to new kinds of global connections and disconnections in the Global South? And what are the pitfalls that accompany this development? Much of the policy literature on digitalisation and development has focused on the importance of connecting developing countries to digital networks. Good connection to digital networks may have a fundamental impact on societies, changing not only how individuals and businesses navigate, operate and seek opportunities, but also as regards relations between government and the citizenry. However, the rapid pace of this development implies that digital technologies are being put to use before good, functional regulatory mechanisms have been developed and installed. The resultant shortcomings – in state mechanisms, institutions, coordination mechanisms, private mechanisms, general awareness, public knowledge and skills – open the door to new kinds of vulnerabilities. Herein lie dangers, but also opportunities for donor/recipient country exchange. Instead of adding to the already substantial literature on the potential dividends, this article examines a less studied issue: the new societal vulnerabilities emerging from digitalisation in developing countries. While there is wide agreement about the need to bridge the gap between the connected and the disconnected, the pitfalls are many.
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17 |
ID:
118467
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18 |
ID:
171963
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Summary/Abstract |
Cybersecurity experts foster a perception of cybersecurity as a gloomy underworld in which the good guys must resort to unconventional tactics to keep at bay a motley group of threats to the digital safety of unsuspecting individuals, businesses, and governments. This article takes this framing seriously, drawing on film studies scholarship that identifies certain aesthetic themes as associated with moral ambiguity in noir films. This article introduces the term “cyber-noir” to describe the incorporation of noir elements in cybersecurity expert discourses. It argues that the concept of cyber-noir helps explain the persistence of practices that blur legal, moral, and professional lines between legitimate and malicious activity in cyberspace. Consequently, changing cybersecurity requires not only institutional and technological measures, but also a re-constitution of cybersecurity identities themselves.
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19 |
ID:
116170
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The 'cyber' issue is not new, but rather has taken a half-century to develop. Indeed, it was already decades old before the general public and many senior leaders recognized its salience in the mid-1990s. It developed, moreover, along a logical path, which can be depicted as the successive dawning (for American policymakers, officials, and intelligence officers) of four insights, each of which was glimpsed in theory at least shortly before empirical evidence verified that it was indeed a reality to consider in setting policies, standards, and doctrine. Thus the official responses to the emergence of the cyber issue in the late-1990s were shaped by the outcomes of those earlier debates; the options available to policy-makers in the White House, Congress, the Pentagon, and the various agencies were already conditioned and even determined by previous arguments.
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20 |
ID:
135740
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Publication |
New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2014.
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Description |
84p.Pbk
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Series |
IDSA Monograph Series No.42, December 2014
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Standard Number |
9789382169482
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
058079 | 005.8/SAM 058079 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
058080 | 005.8/SAM 058080 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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