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| 1 |
ID:
108179
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| 2 |
ID:
131737
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| 3 |
ID:
188337
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| Summary/Abstract |
After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, a Pakistan spy chief told journalists in Kabul: ‘don’t worry, everything will be okay’ in Afghanistan. What is interesting to note in this assertion is that Pakistan had consistently been accused of playing a ‘double game’ in the war on terror since 2001. This paper examines the return of the Taliban and Pakistan’s role in their victory in August-2021. In particular, it addresses the following questions: Why are Pakistan-Afghanistan relations so fraught? What is the pattern of Pakistan’s influence over the Afghan Taliban? How different is the post- 2021 Taliban regime from its Taliban predecessors (1996–2001)? What might the long-term implications of the Taliban victory be for Pakistan? This paper employs the security-cum-rentier state framework to explain Pakistan’s double game in the war on terror. Moreover, this paper aims to situate and contextualize the situation in Afghanistan (2001–2021) in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry, i.e. Quad/ Indo-Pacific Strategy (West) versus the Belt and Road Initiative (China). Methodologically, this study is based on secondary sources and some primary sources (official documents).
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| 4 |
ID:
146849
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| 5 |
ID:
127218
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| 6 |
ID:
132445
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| 7 |
ID:
096335
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| 8 |
ID:
116613
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States has more leverage over Pakistan than is widely appreciated, and it is time for American policymakers to use it. Since 2001, two successive administrations have tried to persuade Pakistan to end its support for militants-including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network-exclusively through aid, diplomacy, and persuasion with few sanctions or conditions: an approach of all carrots and no sticks. They did so in the belief that Pakistan's fundamental problem was a lack of capacity, not will. They were wrong.
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| 9 |
ID:
119293
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| 10 |
ID:
146757
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| 11 |
ID:
132224
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| 12 |
ID:
102696
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
U.S. STRATEGY toward Pakistan is focused on trying to get Islamabad to give serious help to Washington's campaign against the Afghan Taliban. There are two rather large problems with this approach. The first is that it is never going to happen. As U.S. diplomats in Pakistan themselves recognize (and as was made ever so clear by the WikiLeaks dispatches), both Pakistani strategic calculations and the feelings of the country's population make it impossible for Islamabad to take such a step, except in return for U.S. help against India-which Washington also cannot deliver.
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| 13 |
ID:
106517
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| 14 |
ID:
118707
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| 15 |
ID:
109052
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| 16 |
ID:
115487
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| 17 |
ID:
187460
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| 18 |
ID:
102323
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| 19 |
ID:
149710
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| Summary/Abstract |
Jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan have experienced leadership turnover and are contending with the emergence of the Islamic State in the region. Antonio Giustozzi assesses the balance of power between militant groups in the borderlands.
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| 20 |
ID:
122865
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