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| 1 |
ID:
118262
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
[Thirty-three] years after the revolution, Iran's ruling elite is still unable to resolve differences on policy and the country's future direction through negotiation and compromise.
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| 2 |
ID:
092223
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The crisis over Iran's growing nuclear weapons capabilities is rapidly reaching a critical point. Recent developments do not bode well for the prospect of successful negotiations that can end concerns about Iran's nuclear program, at least in the short term.
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| 3 |
ID:
110979
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 7 February, the Iranian parliament (Majlis-e Shora-ye Islami) summoned President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for questioning over his domestic and foreign policies. Ahmadinejad has a month in which to appear before the legislature, in what is the first time since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 that parliament has demanded to cross-examine the president. This timetable means he could appear close to the 2 March legislative elections.
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| 4 |
ID:
171583
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| 5 |
ID:
122090
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| 6 |
ID:
122003
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Foreign reactions to Hassan Rowhani's 14 June election as Iran's next president ranged from delight to dismay. A better response is cautious optimism. Rowhani will not be able to solve the nuclear crisis. Nor is he likely to do much that will make it worse than would be the case under any other Iranian leader. But he has a mandate for change and a disposition towards pragmatism which provide a ray of hope.
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| 7 |
ID:
109894
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| 8 |
ID:
115075
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
You are not a wise man, you tyrant," raps the Iranian female singer Bahar. "Why do your clothes smell like blood??.?.?.?Why do you crush this cry for justice? The people don't deserve such disdain." Her chiding words against Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei go to the heart of the problem that the Islamic Republic faces: the growing illegitimacy of a cruel and inaccessible theocracy whose control over Iran might well be slipping.
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| 9 |
ID:
123043
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In June, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Rouhani ran as a reform candidate, and many have interpreted his victory as a harbinger of a possible liberalization or rationalization of Iranian domestic and foreign policy. But the dominant figure in Iranian politics is not the president but rather the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Iranian constitution endows the supreme leader with tremendous authority over all major state institutions, and Khamenei, who has held the post since 1989, has found many other ways to further increase his influence. Formally or not, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government all operate under his absolute sovereignty; Khamenei is Iran's head of state, commander in chief, and top ideologue. His views are what will ultimately shape Iranian policy, and so it is worth exploring them in detail.
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