| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite new interest in the implications of growing institutional density for international cooperation, and in so-called public-private governance, the interplay between public and private regimes has so far been largely overlooked. This article draws on the emerging literature on parallel regimes in international governance to analyze the evolution of the norms and rules governing sovereign debt restructuring from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s, with a particular focus on the interplay between those covering official bilateral (or Paris Club) debt, and those dealing with private credits. It shows how, from the mid-1990s onward, changes in market and political environments turned burden sharing between bilateral and private creditors into a contentious issue, partly undermining the existing framework for public-private cooperation, and confirms that a focus on institutional interplay can help identify some of the key dynamics behind public-private cooperation.
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