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| 1 |
ID:
126021
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Theoretically, variation in leadership preferences is often taken to be an important predictor of ethno-territorial conflict outcomes. Yet there is a significant gap when it comes to applying this theory. Case studies do not take a consistent approach to measuring leadership preferences, while statistical research tends to omit the variable altogether. This paper suggests a standardized approach to measuring leadership preferences along two dimensions - a dimension that captures the weight given to achieving ideal nationalist goals as against minimizing conflict costs and downside conflict risks, and a dimension that indicates how much intrinsic nationalist goals are valued relative to the goal of taking and maintaining political power. The resulting measurement template is then applied to seven potential ethno-territorial conflicts in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. These cases indicate that leadership preferences may help to explain ethno-territorial conflict outcomes and, at the same time, are sometimes not well predicted by other important variables, such as the balance of power and the pre-conflict status quo.
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| 2 |
ID:
092262
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When China embarked on economic reform in the late 1970s, its leaders aspired to learn from Japan's developmental policies that were restrictive of foreign capital. In the 1990s, China strove again to emulate Japan and South Korea in restricting foreign direct investment and promoting indigenous corporations. Despite these efforts, China's industrial catch-up was in fact led by FDI, in sharp contrast to the classic Japanese/Korean paradigm where FDI was strictly circumvented. Why was China unsuccessful in learning restrictive FDI policies? How did a new developmental path emerge in China? The answer lies in China's strong networks with diaspora communities. Through a diffusion mechanism, ties between local governments and diaspora capital helped initiate and catalyze China's FDI liberalization, despite the central efforts to learn from Japan and South Korea. Two critical reform episodes are examined: (1) the establishment of special economic zones and (2) the reform of state-owned enterprises.
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| 3 |
ID:
122409
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In internal ethno-territorial conflicts, what explains why state or rebel group leaderships use civilian-targeting strategies-expulsion or mass killing strategies designed to punish enemy civilians or to decimate the enemy civilian presence on contested territory? One argument is that those living under the worst initial conditions-defined in terms of collective goods such as weak collective autonomy, policy outcomes, and material conditions-are most likely to target enemy group civilians. Another approach focuses on relative power-arguing that the enemy civilian population is targeted either because of weaker or stronger relative power. A third approach argues that differences in leadership preferences-in particular, more ideologically extreme or power-seeking preferences-are likely to drive direct assaults on enemy civilians. We examine these proposed mechanisms in terms of expected effects on benefits and costs in a simple ethno-territorial bargaining framework. We argue that relative power advantages and more extreme nationalist preferences seem most likely to predict decisions to target enemy civilian populations. We expect strongly power-seeking preferences to lead to civilian targeting more conditionally-where there is a greater internal political threat along with either greater relative power or a more moderate enemy. Last, we do not expect that variation in initial conditions will have a significant direct effect. We apply the framework to explain patterns of civilian targeting following the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991.
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