| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper draws on two academic articles that highlight the need to resolve the violence of 'spoilers', i.e. armed political factions that could spoil a negotiated end to conflict. They both make interesting contributions within their own field of peacekeeping literature but we think that their proposed agenda, which is the study of 'spoilers', can be improved with the incorporation of Axel Honneth's 'Recognition Theory'. While we do not wade into the deeper debate about recognition theory, we think that the basic tenets of this theory can help improve the analysis of spoiler theory and, consequently, the prescriptions for its usage in the context of resolving ongoing violence in Iraq. Based on our own rereading of 'spoiler theory' we will argue for the benefits of incorporating informal negotiations into the formalised debate that is currently taking place in Iraq's political institutions.
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