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1 |
ID:
133506
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article proposes an analytical perspective on jihadist radicalization that focuses on the immediate social environment from which clandestine violent groups emerge, to which they remain socially and symbolically connected, and from which they receive some degree of support. Based on a detailed analysis of the "Sauerland-Group" it traces relational dynamics shaping individual pathways as well as processes of group formation within local Salafist milieus, the wider Salafist movement, and radical jihadist networks. It argues that one characteristic feature of "homegrown" jihadist groups is their simultaneous connection to and embeddedness in various different social contexts as well as the fluid, ad-hoc character of the clandestine group and its ambivalent relation with its supportive social environment
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2 |
ID:
149710
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Summary/Abstract |
Jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan have experienced leadership turnover and are contending with the emergence of the Islamic State in the region. Antonio Giustozzi assesses the balance of power between militant groups in the borderlands.
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3 |
ID:
092317
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this article is to look at the importance and treatment that Spain receives in jihadist propaganda. This study offers a series of empirical observations based on a content analysis of a sample of propaganda produced by jihadist groups between January 1994 and September 2008. The analysis of this material, the context in which it was spread, and a comparison with other Western countries leads to the conclusion that the role played by this country in jihadist propaganda can only be understood by taking into account "structural factors" that have little to do with a greater or lesser level of interference in "Islamic affairs.
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4 |
ID:
119763
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The war in Mali broke out on 11 January 2013 in the form of an out-of-theblue French offensive against two armed columns heading towards Bamako, the country's capital. During the following weeks, a brigade-sized French force, accompanied by a similar number of soldiers from West African countries, reclaimed an area the size of Texas from jihadist groups, which in spring 2012 proclaimed to have set up an independent territory called Azawad in the northern 60% of Mali.1 Although the war in Mali was not a blitzkrieg, as claimed by some, in some ways it can be considered a harbinger of postmodern conflict.2 The war may yet slide into a strategic dead end reminiscent of Iraq and Afghanistan, but such a fate is not preordained.
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5 |
ID:
167183
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Summary/Abstract |
The paper compares political territoriality of selected jihadist violent non-state actors. Looking at selected groups that attempted to control territory (Afghan Taliban, Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State), it attempts to establish a generalization regarding the use of territory by this type of violent non-state actors. To this end, it analyses connection of territory to groups´ security provision, economic activity, and identity. Despite many differences among the groups, it concludes that these groups often utilize both territorial and personal characteristics. Territoriality of these actors is reactive as they are unable to present a sustained control in contested regions.
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6 |
ID:
104636
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