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| 1 |
ID:
148155
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| Summary/Abstract |
If one trend characterizes the study of foreign and security policy over the past several decades, it may be the search for concepts that assist in addressing the complexity of global politics.2 We embrace that complexity and reimagine security as a social phenomenon that interweaves between social collectives, bleeding across boundaries and tying collectivities together as they seek to reconcile different systems of security meaning-making. At its core, security is a socially constructed system for making sense of danger and threat (Buzan et al. 1998). Thinking about security as a phenomenon of linked social constructions opens the field of inquiry up to a massive amount of complexity and interactivity. We offer two concepts as a possible basis for thinking about the ways in which security systems interact with and influence the operation of other security systems: multidirectionality and anticipated reaction.
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| 2 |
ID:
092338
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While almost a decade old, Ted Hopf's observation that the democratic peace is an observation in search of a theory still holds validity. In particular, the mechanisms behind the democratic peace are poorly understood, making it difficult for scholars to provide a compelling explanation. Underappreciated in the existing work is the role of identity and the importance this has for driving the democratic peace. With a focus on developing a dyadic democratic peace mechanism and using a case study approach, this paper utilizes the Copenhagen School's securitization framework to examine how identity plays out in the US response to the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs. It finds that in fact identity does play an important role in how security policy is constructed. In policy terms, if the democratic peace does rely on identity to trigger the constraining norms that limit the escalation of conflict to violence, it is unlikely the democratic peace can be spread by force and it is possible that states nominally democratic can be excluded from the community of democracies if their behavior or significant other aspects of their perceived identity are at variance with the accepted democratic identity standard.
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| 3 |
ID:
146343
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Despite the lack of an obvious threat to Britain, the Blair government invaded Iraq in 2003 alongside the United States. This article draws on securitization theory and social identity approaches from social psychology to propose that the democratic political identity vested in Britain’s domestic society facilitated the Blair government’s effort to construct Iraq as a threat, but in other ways constrained the ability of the Blair government to pursue the use of force without substantial domestic political costs. Using a multimethod approach, the article examines the discourses in the lead up to the invasion to support the central argument as well as to explore the domestic security authority held by United Nations. In so doing, the article addresses not only the British case, but also larger questions regarding the factors that shape the construction of an issue as one of security and the appropriate policy responses.
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| 4 |
ID:
144295
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In 2008, the announcement of the Global Zero campaign—an international effort to eliminate nuclear weapons—coincided with the election of Barack Obama. The new president, avowedly pro-disarmament, made getting to zero nuclear weapons a centerpiece of his foreign policy. This article takes on the question of what impact global disarmament might have on international strategic stability. In a break with much of the literature and analysis on nuclear policy, it explicitly focuses on how publics understand the significance of nuclear weapons. In so doing, the article draws on recent international relations scholarship on the role of habit to argue that eliminating nuclear weapons can generate instability by creating widespread perceptions of insecurity and anxiety. If disarmament campaigners wish to achieve their goal without generating instability, they will need to work over the long-term to break habituated beliefs about nuclear weapons.
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| 5 |
ID:
156179
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| 6 |
ID:
112132
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Democratic Peace stands as one of the most coherent and recognizable programs of study in international relations. Yet despite the pages of research devoted to the subject and claims about its law-like nature, the democratic peace remains a highly contested finding. In large part, this contestation arises out of an enduring question: What exactly keeps democracies from fighting? Drawing on the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School as well as social psychology, this article claims that a critical mechanism of the democratic peace lies at the political junction between policymakers and the public. I argue that the democratic identity of the public, grounded in basic democratic norms essential for the function of any democracy at any time, plays an independent role in the construction of security and foreign policy in the United States. To test the argument, I examine the difficult case of the 1971 Bangladesh War, when President Richard Nixon sent the USS Enterprise carrier group to the Bay of Bengal. Analysis of public statements as well as administration documentation reveals that, while Nixon and national security advisor Henry Kissinger actively saw India as a threat to U.S. interests, they were constrained by their belief that the public would not accept a security argument with respect to a fellow democracy.
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| 7 |
ID:
132396
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Inspired by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein's call for analytic eclecticism and making use of newly available, previously classified archival documents, we distill the essential logics of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism and examine their role in shaping the debates amongst British policymakers in the context of German unification in 1989-90. We find that, although all the theoretical logics help shape the policymaking surrounding unification, none stands alone as a basis for understanding social reality. Indeed, all functioned together as British policymakers thought in terms of theory to make sense of German unification. The logic of realism clearly played an important role in shaping the perceptions of top British leadership, particularly Margaret Thatcher, of German unification as a problem. But realism did not determine the solution to the "problem." Instead, British policymakers drew on the logic embedded in neoliberal institutionalism, turning to institutions to manage the unification process. The reason for this can be found in the role of constructivist logics-particularly identity and rhetorical entrapment-that constrained British policymakers to cooperative policy options. By taking this approach, this article makes several important contributions. First, it sheds light on British policy during a critical historical moment. Second, it significantly improves understanding regarding Germany's historical and current place in Europe. Third, it ties major theoretical traditions together through a foreign policy analytical approach, and in the process suggests that many of the theoretical boundaries separating scholars are overdrawn. Finally, the article pushes international relations scholars to keep in mind the complex relationship between reality and theory. In the final analysis, bringing to bear these three perspectives highlights the complexity of the processes that produced British policy-and by extension those that shaped German unification-as well as the importance of breaking free of the strictures of the ideas versus materiality debate.
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