| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, I argue that the so-called ‘intifada of knives’ in 2015–2016 was not a new phenomenon in the Palestinian resistance. Instead, it paralleled the situation in Gaza in the mid-1980s when Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members engaged in similar attacks. What both periods share is the absence of efficient organisational vehicles facilitating a more durable form of collective resistance. This was the case in the mid-1980s because PIJ was yet to develop the effective organisational structures required to facilitate the resistance its members desired, and this was also the case in 2015–2016 because Palestinian youth are largely disillusioned with Palestinian political factions and traditional party politics as arenas to implement change. As these and similar outbursts of violence offer few, or no, principles for political organising for those who follow, what marked the wave of stabbings in the mid-2010s was not the fury with which they were carried out, but rather the rapidity of their collapse. I thus argue that certain organisational principles are required to sustain and prolong any popular protests for a sufficient period.
|