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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
138335
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article considers the importance of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan in driving British Islamic extremist terrorism during the past decade. Between 2003 and 2013, almost 50 British-born Muslims engaged in multiple high-profile terrorism conspiracies. All were designed to kill or seriously injure British citizens. Drawing on recently obtained court transcripts which offer remarkable detail, these plots are analysed from the point of view of radicalization, finance, training and operational direction. The emergence of extremist terrorism in the UK has its genesis within the Islamic fundamentalist movement, a socio-political ideology that arrived in London in the early 1990s. Contrary to the prevailing discourse, members of the movement constitute a far from homogenous set of individuals. Based on age, overseas connections, experience of conflict and religiosity, they each fulfill diverse tasks that range from preaching and fundraising to facilitating combative jihad. A minority adopted an extremist position that led them to carry out acts of terrorism. Since 2006, the role of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan in relation to this process has steadily declined. For the past seven years British Islamic extremists have pursued terrorism in whatever way they can on their own, with little or any direct support or influence from overseas. The security agencies are now asking how far current events in Syria will overturn this state of affairs.
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| 2 |
ID:
092452
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the advent of a UK National Security Strategy in 2008, there has been surprisingly little public discussion of the long-term future of the intelligence and security services, together with cognate subject of special operations.
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| 3 |
ID:
133417
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1966, in what has become known as the Wilson Doctrine, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, informed Parliament that he had issued an instruction that the telephones of parliamentarians were not to be intercepted by the intelligence and security agencies. Subsequent Prime Ministers have all expressed their continued commitment to the Wilson Doctrine. This article examines the nature and limitations of the Wilson Doctrine, and its continued application in the context of recent legislative changes and a number of prominent recent cases. It focuses on apparent changes to the scope and attempts to set aside the Wilson Doctrine under the Blair government and the implications of the interception of the communications of Sinn Fein Members of Parliament, and the bugging of meetings involving the Labour MP Sadiq Khan.
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| 4 |
ID:
152399
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| 5 |
ID:
124790
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article engages one of the most widely discussed but poorly understood aspects of the Iraq War: the use of violence by private security companies. It explains why, despite sharing several important characteristics-coming from the same general population of military and police veterans, working for the same client during the same time period, performing the same tasks under the same client-imposed rules of engagement, and facing the same kinds of threats in the same general operating environment-the personnel who worked for Blackwater, the chief protector of US State Department employees in Iraq, killed and seriously injured far more people than their counterparts in DynCorp. The article argues that Blackwater's personnel killed and seriously injured far more people in Iraq than their DynCorp counterparts because Blackwater maintained a relatively bellicose military culture that placed strong emphasis on norms encouraging its security teams to exercise personal initiative, proactive use of force, and an exclusive approach to security, which together motivated its personnel to use violence quite freely against anyone suspected of posing a threat. If the trends established during the Iraq and Afghan Wars continue, then private security companies will see extensive employment in future conflicts. These findings, consequently, have implications that extend beyond the Iraq War and the particular firms under study. Indeed, they indicate that governments and other future clients should analyze the military cultures of the firms vying for their business and use the results as a basis for deciding which firms to hire and, to a great extent, represent them in unstable conflict zones.
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