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ID:
191904
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| Summary/Abstract |
International organizations come in many shapes and sizes. Within this institutional gamut, the multipurpose multilateral intergovernmental organization (MMIGO) plays a central role. This institutional form is often traced to the creation of the League of Nations, but in fact the first MMIGO emerged in the Western Hemisphere at the close of the nineteenth century. Originally modeled on a single-issue European public international union, the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics evolved into the multipurpose, multilateral Pan American Union (PAU). Contrary to prominent explanations of institutional genesis, the PAU's design did not result from functional needs nor from the blueprints of a hegemonic power. Advancing a recent synthesis between historical and rational institutionalism, we argue that the first MMIGO arose through a process of compensatory layering: a mechanism whereby a sequence of bargains over control and scope leads to gradual but transformative institutional change. We expect compensatory layering to occur when an organization is focal, power asymmetries among members of that organization are large, and preferences over institutional design diverge. Our empirical and theoretical contributions demonstrate the value a more global international relations (IR) perspective can bring to the study of institutional design. international relations (IR) scholars have long noted that international organizations provide smaller states with voice opportunities; our account suggests those spaces may be of smaller states’ own making.
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| 2 |
ID:
186079
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using institutional choice theory, this article seeks to explain why the G5 Sahel, an international organization that comprises Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, was created in 2014 and tasked to deal with conflict management in the Sahel through its Joint Force that was established in 2017. While the use of the theory offers crucial insights into the creation of the G5 Sahel, I also find that the theory overestimates the costs and risks attached to the creation of a new institution while underestimating the desire of states to maintain control over actions on the ground – at least when it comes to security questions.
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| 3 |
ID:
182868
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| Summary/Abstract |
While much has been written about the resurgence of traditional authorities in sub-Saharan Africa, we know less about what explains differences in the institutional and regulatory frameworks that link traditional leaders to formal governments. Even though they have rarely been applied to resurging traditional leaders, existing theories of institutional choice are likely to yield important insights when applied to different models of mixed governance. In this article, the author closely examines the origins of the institutional framework that presently governs the relations between the central government and traditional authorities in Namibia. The author finds that both exogenous motivations such as the ideology of policymakers and endogenous determinants such as the potential for electoral mobilization matter for understanding the forms that mixed governance takes.
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| 4 |
ID:
092511
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