Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:4498Hits:25701414Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
TAX COMPETITION (3) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   092515


Informal tax competition among local government in China since / Choi, Eun Kyong   Journal Article
Choi, Eun Kyong Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2009.
Key Words China  Local Government  Tax Reform  Tax Competition  Informality 
        Export Export
2
ID:   120572


International tax rules: moving towards transparency / Shepenko, R   Journal Article
Shepenko, R Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract STATES AND TERRITORIES are cautious about exchanging information for tax purposes even though such exchange has long been recognized as a tool for combating international tax evasion. In the late 1930s, most governments polled on behalf of the League of Nations noted the difficulties they would face in exchanging information and listed the reasons for this. At first glance, these reasons were quite diverse, but on closer inspection it becomes obvious that the problem lay in the difficulty of amending legislation so as to allow governments to demand information from their subjects not for domestic purposes but for meeting the requests of other states
        Export Export
3
ID:   195034


Tax competition among local governments: Evidence from the spillovers of location-based tax incentives in China / Tao, Peng   Journal Article
Tao, Peng Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract This paper exploits the tax incentives in China's Great Western Development (GWD) Program to identify tax competition among local governments. The reform reduces the statutory corporate income tax rate in GWD regions. Using this exogenous tax reduction as a quasi-natural experiment and adopting a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the reform in GWD regions leads to a 1.6328 percentage point decline in the effective corporate income tax rate and a 0.658 percentage point decline in the macro tax burden in non-GWD counties adjacent to the policy boundary. The results suggest that there are strategic interactions as well as a race to the bottom among counties in their tax setting. The results are stable across a series of robustness tests such as excluding other mechanisms of tax rate interaction and excluding the impact of other incentive policies in the GWD Program. Combined with the tax reduction effect in border GWD counties, we find that the tax interaction coefficient for the effective corporate income tax rate and macro tax burden between GWD and non-GWD counties along the border are 0.8718 and 0.3553, respectively. This reflects the intense tax competition among local governments in China. In addition, we demonstrate that tax competition mainly exists between geographically adjacent counties, as no such spillover effects are observed in non-GWD counties far from the policy boundary.
        Export Export