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Modern View
TAX COMPETITION
(3)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
092515
Informal tax competition among local government in China since
/ Choi, Eun Kyong
Choi, Eun Kyong
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2009.
Key Words
China
;
Local Government
;
Tax Reform
;
Tax Competition
;
Informality
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2
ID:
120572
International tax rules: moving towards transparency
/ Shepenko, R
Shepenko, R
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2013.
Summary/Abstract
STATES AND TERRITORIES are cautious about exchanging information for tax purposes even though such exchange has long been recognized as a tool for combating international tax evasion. In the late 1930s, most governments polled on behalf of the League of Nations noted the difficulties they would face in exchanging information and listed the reasons for this. At first glance, these reasons were quite diverse, but on closer inspection it becomes obvious that the problem lay in the difficulty of amending legislation so as to allow governments to demand information from their subjects not for domestic purposes but for meeting the requests of other states
Key Words
Tax evasion
;
Tax Competition
;
Tax Havens
;
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes
;
International Tax Rules
;
OECD Model Tax Convention
;
Tax Agreements
;
OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes
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3
ID:
195034
Tax competition among local governments: Evidence from the spillovers of location-based tax incentives in China
/ Tao, Peng
Tao, Peng
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
This paper exploits the tax incentives in China's Great Western Development (GWD) Program to identify tax competition among local governments. The reform reduces the statutory corporate income tax rate in GWD regions. Using this exogenous tax reduction as a quasi-natural experiment and adopting a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the reform in GWD regions leads to a 1.6328 percentage point decline in the effective corporate income tax rate and a 0.658 percentage point decline in the macro tax burden in non-GWD counties adjacent to the policy boundary. The results suggest that there are strategic interactions as well as a race to the bottom among counties in their tax setting. The results are stable across a series of robustness tests such as excluding other mechanisms of tax rate interaction and excluding the impact of other incentive policies in the GWD Program. Combined with the tax reduction effect in border GWD counties, we find that the tax interaction coefficient for the effective corporate income tax rate and macro tax burden between GWD and non-GWD counties along the border are 0.8718 and 0.3553, respectively. This reflects the intense tax competition among local governments in China. In addition, we demonstrate that tax competition mainly exists between geographically adjacent counties, as no such spillover effects are observed in non-GWD counties far from the policy boundary.
Key Words
Tax Competition
;
China's GWD program
;
China's Great Western Development
;
Location-based tax incentives in China
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