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| 1 |
ID:
122758
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| 2 |
ID:
107147
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The overarching Western objective in Afghanistan should be to prevent that country from becoming not just a haven for transnational terrorists, but a terrorist ally as well. That was the situation prior to 9/11 and it would be so again if the Taliban returned to power with al-Qaeda backing. NATO can prevent this indefinitely as long as it is willing to commit significant military and economic resources to a counter-insurgency effort. It cannot eliminate the threat, however, as long as the Afghan insurgents enjoy sanctuary in and support from Pakistan. Alternatively, this objective could be achieved if the Taliban could be persuaded to cut its ties to al-Qaeda and end its insurgency in exchange for some role in Afghan governance short of total control.
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| 3 |
ID:
125952
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014 is likely to be followed by a civil war between a predominantly non-Pashtun security apparatus and Pakistan-backed Taliban forces. As we confront this reality, we would be wise to look closely at the experience of the Soviet Union following its occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1980s. The prime lessons from that ill-fated moment are the need to provide continued economic and military support to the leadership in Kabul and to obtain the support of Pakistan, while maintaining sufficient intelligence and covert action infrastructure on both sides of the frontier the two countries share. A sustainable relationship with Pakistan is critical today because of the country's important role in any political solution in Afghanistan and the significant risks to the international community posed by Pakistan's own instability.
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| 4 |
ID:
137454
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| 5 |
ID:
109542
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| 6 |
ID:
130198
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Uncertainties about the 2014 security, political, and economic transitions pervaded Afghanistan in 2013. The failure in 2013 to sign a U.S.-Afghan security agreement permitting the presence of U.S. troops after 2014 deepens those anxieties. As ISAF forces continued to withdraw from Afghanistan, Afghan security forces now have primary responsibility for Afghanistan's security but still face critical challenges and an undefeated Taliban. Peace negotiations have been stalled. Politics were dominated by the upcoming 2014 presidential election that can renew the legitimacy of the existing political system or throw the country into turmoil.
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| 7 |
ID:
108370
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| 8 |
ID:
093936
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Even if all essential parties are interested in a negotiated settlement, getting to yes is no sure thing.
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| 9 |
ID:
129027
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| 10 |
ID:
111780
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
"While many Afghans are highly ambivalent about the presence of foreign forces in their country, they fear a return to civil war even more."
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| 11 |
ID:
117109
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| 12 |
ID:
117110
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| 13 |
ID:
124210
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite strong shared interests and their dependence on US assistance, Kabul and Islamabad frequently fail to cooperate with the USA's post-9/11 security agenda. Why doesn't the USA have more leverage in these alliances and what can it change to be more influential? This article identifies four structural factors in Washington's alliances in Afghanistan and Pakistan ('Af-Pak') contributing to Washington's lack of coercive power: 1) the USA's interest makes coercion difficult; 2) Kabul and Islamabad have more invested and will bargain to protect their interests; 3) the form of US commitment (an intense but explicitly temporary military commitment) produces incentives for Kabul and Islamabad to adopt short-term solutions, frequently running against US interests; and 4) the tenets of counterinsurgency policy cause Washington to be politically dependent on Kabul and Islamabad, effectively reducing its influence.
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| 14 |
ID:
107380
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| 15 |
ID:
109771
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does Pakistan figure in the face-saving deal that the US is trying to thrash out with the Taliban in Doha?
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| 16 |
ID:
118318
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
America's experience of fighting while negotiating in the Korean War and the Vietnam War offers valuable lessons for understanding the current peace talks in Afghanistan: the adversaries are averse to making concessions; violence is a bargaining tool; the fate of captives can derail negotiations; alliances may be strained; broader regional dynamics are critical, and the peace process is imbued with symbolism.
In 2010, with the blessings of U.S. and British intelligence, the Afghan regime engaged in high-level peace talks with a senior Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour. Unfortunately, after handing over tens of thousands of dollars to encourage Mansour's participation, the supposed Taliban leader turned out to be an impostor. Who sent him, and for what reason, is unknown-although suspicions have fallen on the Pakistani intelligence services.
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| 17 |
ID:
118497
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| 18 |
ID:
093538
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States hopes to create a strong central government in Afghanistan -- but is such state building possible? Yes, and policymakers should look to Louis XIV and the development of France's ancien régime for guidance.
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| 19 |
ID:
125099
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
CORRUPTION, MORE often than not, seems to resemble a plague. Afghanistan, where the CIA and British intelligence (in competition with the Iranians) have quite literally been handing over duffel bags stuffed full with taxpayer money to President Hamid Karzai and his associates, is perhaps the most prominent example of its invasiveness and hardiness. Nothing seems to be able to eradicate it. Immunization efforts fail.
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| 20 |
ID:
130102
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