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| 1 |
ID:
116213
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| 2 |
ID:
092721
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| 3 |
ID:
092931
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For over half a century, the Korean Peninsula has posed a foreign-policy dilemma for every American president. During this time, continuity, rather than change, has been the prevailing characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. The recent Bush administration, in relation to its policy towards North Korea, was characterized by its dualism - believing in the same goal, but divided over goal achievement actions. Unfortunately, the internal division of policy at home has resulted in the North Korean nuclear issue being in a worse shape today than it was eight years ago after the Clinton-Bush regime change. After President Bush refused to follow Clinton's engagement path, North Korea significantly increased its plutonium stockpile, tested nuclear bombs and announced itself a "nuclear weapons state." President Barack Obama has inherited difficult issues and initiatives not only on the home front but also internationally. The new Obama administration is inundated with a plethora of policy issues ranging from economics to foreign policy. In the past few years, many experts in North Korean policy have juxtaposed various strategies that have been used and should be included with relation to North Korea. This paper will underline motives for North Korea's actions, updates of previously communicated policy options with real-time information, and offer a unique twist, with truths that are often overlooked, on how they should be implemented in the new Obama era, moving forward.
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| 4 |
ID:
094505
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In different international bodies and in statements by various world leaders, universalisation and a possible revision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are figuring quite frequently. Certainly, in the emerging context for universalisation, the relationship between India and the NPT may be reviewed. Several relevant options are emerging to define the relationship between India and the NPT. This has put the relationship between India and the NPT in the international limelight. As no Indian government can ever be in a position to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), the international community should adopt a realistic approach to bring India into the NPT. And this can only be as a nuclear weapon state (NWS).
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| 5 |
ID:
180283
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| Summary/Abstract |
India conducted Operation Shakti (Pokhran II) nuclear tests during 11–13 May 1998 that ushered her into the cherished nuclear weapons club. It was well calibrated decision to formally choose the nuclear path through the first peaceful nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha (Pokhran I) that was conducted on 18 May 1974. It was significant that without joining the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, India managed to gatecrash into the nuclear weapons capability. It led to articulation of the No First Use (NFU) doctrine on 4 January 2003 (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], 2003). In the wake of 16 August 2019 pronouncement of the Indian Defence Minister on possible review of the NFU, this article seeks to probe the question: Does the NFU doctrine require any such review? It comprises the rational, the promise of NFU, counterforce strategies, NFU with respect to tactical nuclear weapons and associated problems with First Use and NFU.
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| 6 |
ID:
117670
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