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| 1 |
ID:
110581
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2011,
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyzes the value and cost of line-pack flexibility in liberalized gas markets through examination of the techno-economic characteristics of gas transport pipelines and the trade-offs between different ways to use the infrastructure: transport and flexibility. Line-pack flexibility is becoming increasingly important as a tool to balance gas supply and demand over different periods. In the European liberalized market context, a monopolist unbundled network operator offers regulated transport services and flexibility (balancing) services according to the network code and balancing rules. Therefore, gas policy makers should understand the role and consequences of line-pack regulation. The analysis shows that the line-pack flexibility service has an important economic value for the shippers and the TSO. Furthermore, the analysis identifies distorting effects in the gas market due to inadequate regulation of line-pack flexibility: by disregarding the sunk costs of flexibility in the balancing rules, the overall efficiency of the gas system is decreased. Finally, the analysis demonstrates that the actual costs of line-pack flexibility are related to the peak cumulative imbalance throughout the balancing period. Any price for pipeline flexibility should, therefore, be based on the related trade-off between the right to use the line-pack flexibility and the provision of transport services
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| 2 |
ID:
092797
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Long-term supply contracts often have ambiguous effects on the competitive structure, investment and consumer welfare in the long term. In the new market context, these effects are likely to be worsened and thus even harder to assess. Since liberalization and especially since the release of the Energy Sector Inquiry in early 2007, the portfolio of long-term supply contracts of the former incumbents have become a priority for review by the European Commission and the national competition authorities. It is widely believed that European Competition authorities take a dogmatic view on these contracts and systemically emphasize the risk of foreclosure over their positive effects on investment and operation. This paper depicts the methodology that has emerged in the recent line of cases and argues that this interpretation is largely misguided. It shows that a multiple-step approach is used to reduce regulation costs and balance anti-competitive effects with potential efficiency gains. However, if an economic approach is now clearly implemented, competition policy is constrained by the procedural aspect of the legal process and the remedies imposed remain open for discussion.
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| 3 |
ID:
103455
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Electricity storage is considered as a valuable source of flexibility with applications covering the whole electricity value chain. Most of the existing evaluation methods for electricity storage are conceived for one specific use of the storage, which often leads to the conclusion that the investment on storage does not pay off. However, the value of storage cannot be properly estimated without taking into account the possibility of aggregating the services that storage can offer to different actors. This paper proposes a new business model that allows aggregating multiple revenue streams of electricity storage in a systematic way. The model consists in coordinating a series of auctions in which the right to utilize the storage unit is auctioned upon different time horizons. In the mean time, non-conflicting usage of storage by the actors in these different auctions is ensured. The functioning of the model is demonstrated by a case study. The results show that a storage unit can achieve higher return on investment in the manner proposed in the business model.
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| 4 |
ID:
127900
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan) expiring in 2020, the EU needs to revisit its energy technology policy for the post-2020 horizon and to establish a policy framework that fosters the achievement of ambitious EU commitments for decarbonization by 2050. We discuss options for a post-2020 EU energy technology policy, taking account of uncertain technology developments, uncertain carbon prices and the highly competitive global market for energy technologies. We propose a revised SET Plan that enables policy makers to be pro-active in pushing innovation in promising technologies, no matter what policy context will be realized in the future. In particular, a revised SET Plan should include a more technology-specific focus, provide the basis for planning and prioritization among decarbonization technologies, and should be based on a comprehensive approach across sectors. Selected technology targets and EU funding of innovation should be in line with the SET Plan prioritization.
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| 5 |
ID:
149982
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| Summary/Abstract |
The European Union took more than 20 years to start defining a common market design for its internal electricity market: a European Power Target Model. And, a further 10 years to fully implement it. Meanwhile, the reference generation set of that model has shifted from CCGT burning gas to RES plants transforming intermittent natural resources. Could the existing EU target model continue to work well for the short- term operation and long-term investment? If not, can the existing EU institutions easily produce an “RES resilient” new power target model?
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